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EARLY ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A 
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CONTEXT: 
EXPERIMENTATION WITH THE OFFEROR PROCESS 
AT THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION 
CARL TOBIAS* 
During the 1980s Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) has come of 
age. 1 Much experimentation with consensual decisional processes has been 
conducted in the context of federal administrative agency proceedings. The 
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) has stamped its 
imprimatur on the concept of ADR, the Environmental Protection Agency 
has negotiated successfully several rulemakings, and a plethora of addi-
tional agencies have implemented, are experimenting with, or are contem-
plating the application of, consensual decisional processes. The efficacy 
of ADR remains controversial and debate continues over how best to 
implement consensual procedures, while much agency experimentation has 
• Professor of Law, University of Montana. Thanks to Barry Boyer, Tom Huff, Bill 
Luneburg, Bill Rossbach, Peggy Sanner and Roy Schotland for valuable suggestions, all 
who so generously offered opinions on the offeror process, and the Harris Trust for 
generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. For definitions of ADR, see Leiberman & Henry, Lessons From the Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 424 (1986). For definitions of ADR, 
and helpful compilations of mechanisms available, in a federal administrative agency context, 
see Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) Recommendation 86-3, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 25,641, 25,643-45 (1986) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1987)). These mechanisms 
are discussed thoroughly in P. Harter, Points on A Continuum: Dispute Resolution Proce-
dures and the Administrative Process (1986), a report prepared by the ACUS and on which 
its Recommendation is premised. Cf. Harter, The Role of Courts in Regulatory Negotiation-
A Response to Judge Wald, 11 CoLUM. J. ENvr. L. 51, 69 (1986) (and sources cited therein); 
Susskind & McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON 
REG. 133, 165 (1985) (and sources cited therein) (examples of widespread application of 
ADR, especially in administrative context). See generally G. BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRON-
MENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE (1985) (survey of ADR in environmental 
context}. For representative views that capture the controversial nat,ure of ADR, see Edwards, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668, 684 (1986}; 
McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985}; Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 
YALE L.J. 1669 (1985}; Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). Numerous 
decisional mechanisms could be used as a paradigm, but regulatory negotiation is employed 
in this Article for several reasons. It has been the subject of much successful experimentation, 
close evaluation, and careful data collection, while it is typical of, and fungible with, 
numerous other decisional processes. For a recent evaluation of four negotiated rulemakings 
that have been completed, see Perritt, Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: 
Evaluation of Recommendations By the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 
GEO. L.J. 1625 (1986). For compilations of other past, ongoing and contemplated negotiated 
rulemakings, see id. at 1682-88; Administrative Conference of the United States, 1 Admin. 
Conf. News 8 (1987). 
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proceeded slowly by trial and error pursuant to certain suggested condi-
tions. These considerations make it important not only to analyze current 
exploratory efforts but also to evaluate precursors of mechanisms currently 
undergoing experimentation. One of the most significant of these f orerun-
ners with which the Consumer Product Safety Commission {CPSC) ex-
perimented in the 1970s was the offeror process, an innovative administrative 
procedure in which extra-agency entities developed proposed consumer 
product safety standards. Now that dispute resolution approaches similar 
to the offeror process are being applied widely, it is important to explore 
the offeror process to ascertain how experience with it informs present 
experimentation. 2 
The first part of this paper discusses the origins and development of 
the offeror procedure, especially its institution and implementation at the 
CPSC. The next section analyzes the quality and effect on decisional 
processes of funded citizen participation in the seven offeror proceedings 
conducted by that agency. The third segment draws conclusions about the 
reimbursed involvement and about the offeror process from the Commis-
sion's experience. The last portion affords suggestions for future experi-
mentation with participant compensation and with successors of the off eror 
mechanism. 
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 0FFEROR PROCEDURE 
A. Origins and Nascent Development 
The origins and early development of the offeror process warrant only 
cursory treatment.3 During 1967, Congress created the National Commis-
2. I recently analyzed funded public participation in proceedings of the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission. See Tobias, Of Great Expectations and Mismatched Compen-
sation: Government Sponsored Public Participation In Proceedings Of The Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. (1986). "Reimbursement," "compensation" 
and "funding" are used synonymously in this Article to mean voluntary payment from 
agency resources for expenses incurred by public participants in administrative proceedings. 
"Public" and "citizen" are employed interchangeably to mean "nonindustry." The terms 
"involvement," "participation" and "activity" are used synonymously to mean input 
intended to contribute to resolution of issues in proceedings. "Efficacy" and "effectiveness" 
are employed interchangeably to describe the impact public participation has on agency 
decisionmaking. When collecting data for the evaluation mentioned above, I also assembled 
considerable information on citizen participation in the offeror process. The material gathered 
on compensated participation in offeror initiatives was not reported principally because the 
funded involvement differs in certain respects from the reimbursed activity examined earlier 
and partly because the offeror proceedings were broadly condemned as a failed experiment, 
and the procedure was abolished. 
3. Others have treated competently these matters. See Schwartz, The Consumer 
Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Consumer Decade, 51 GEO. WASH. 
L. REv. 32 (1982) (evaluation of offeror process, CPSC, and CPSC's legislation and 
procedures on which I rely substantially in this article); see also Scalia & Goodman, 
Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 899 (1973) 
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sion on Product Safety (NCPS), which was to analyze thoroughly consumer 
product hazards and determine whether new protections were needed to 
reduce harm attributable to consumer products.4 The National Commission 
undertook a comprehensive assessment and published a Final Report in 
1970. NCPS concluded that unreasonable product hazards unduly endan-
gered consumers and found that existing measures, such as federal and 
state legislation, producer self-regulation and common law tort causes of 
action, were inadequate.5 Thus, the NCPS suggested that Congress estab-
lish a new governmental entity and endow it with substantial authority, 
the most relevant of which would be the power to promulgate industry-
wide consumer product safety standards. Moreover, the statute which the 
National Commission recommended that Congress enact included a specific 
provision for the offeror process.6 
B. Legislation 
In 1972, Congress adopted the suggestion of the NCPS, making the 
offeror mechanism a centerpiece of the Consumer Product Safety Act 
(CPSA), which created the Consumer Product Safety Commission and 
granted it comprehensive authority to regulate consumer products.7 The 
offeror process was a novel two-step procedure for CPSC promulgation 
of mandatory safety standards. When the agency found that compulsory 
controls were necessary to protect the public from risks posed by consumer 
products, the CPSC issued a Notice of Proceeding (NOP) inviting extra-
Commission entities to suggest existing requirements or to offer to develop 
new ones.8 Offerors might be individual citizens; public interest organi-
zations, such as the National Consumers League (NCL); voluntary stand-
ards writing organizations, such as the American Society for Testing and 
Materials (ASTM); industry trade associations, such as the Outdoor Power 
Equipment Institute (OPEi); or manufacturers, distributors or retailers of 
(another helpful early assessment of same considerations); Special Issue: The Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1001 (1975) (same); Perritt, supra note 
l, at 1630-36 (origins and development of analogous concept of negotiated rulemaking); cf. 
Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public Participation: Resolving the Issue of Agency Authority 
to Reimburse Public Participants in Administrative Proceedings, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 906, 
907-18 (1982) (origins and development of funded public participation). 
4. See Joint Resolution to Establish a National Commission on Product Safety, Pub. 
L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 466, 470 (1967). See generally Scalia & Goodman, supra note 3, at 
900; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 36 (discussions of National Commission's creation). 
5. See National Comm'n on Prod. Safety, Final Report Presented to the President 
and Congress 1-3 (1970). See generally Scalia & Goodman, supra note 3, at 900-01; Schwartz, 
supra note 3, at 36-41 (discussions of National Commission's work). 
6. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 41-42, 57-58. "But is was not given careful 
consideration." Id. at 57 n.176. 
7. See Scalia & Goodman, supra note 3, at 901-16; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 42-
45, 57-58. 
8. See Scalia & Goodman, supra note 3, at 907; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 59. 
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the product considered to present risk to the public.9 Interested entities 
were afforded thirty days in which to submit proposals, 10 and the CPSC 
had to choose at least one applicant unless extant safety standards were 
deemed sufficient to protect the public. 11 Moreover, the agency could 
"agree to contribute to the offeror's cost" in developing proposed re-
quirements.12 Those individuals or groups selected by the CPSC as offerors 
had to provide opportunities for involvement of "interested persons (in-
cluding representatives of consumers and consumer organizations)" in 
standard development.13 The CPSA, however, left to Commission judg-
ment the specifics of nonindustry participation14 and was silent about 
reimbursement for such activity. 15 Congress was nearly as cryptic about 
the role the legislative branch envisioned for the agency while the proposed 
standard was being developed.16 Offerors were given 150 days from issu-
ance of the NOP to tender recommendations. 17 
Upon receipt of an offeror's submission, the CPSC had sixty days to 
terminate the initiative or to issue a proposed consumer product safety 
standard. 18 If the Commission decided to proceed, the agency published a 
proposed safety standard which might include all or none of the offeror's 
suggestions. 19 Issuance of the proposal triggered the second phase of the 
offeror process that essentially was to follow the informal rulemaking 
requirements imposed under the Administrative Procedure Act.20 
Dissatisfaction with the offeror process, articulated by numerous in-
dividuals and entities that participated in or were familiar with the seven 
proceedings which the CPSC conducted, led Congress to amend the 
procedure during 1978.21 However, the offeror process was not employed 
subsequently, and Congress eliminated it in 1981 while providing for 
9. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 59; cf. id. at 58; Scalia & Goodman, supra note 
3, at 913-15 (discussion of special provision for offeror that is manufacturer, distributor or 
retailer). 
IO. See 15 U.S.C. § 2056(b)(4) (Supp. II 1972) (repealed 1981). 
11. See id. § 2056(c)-(d) (repealed 1981); Scalia & Goodman, supra note 3, at 907. 
12. 15 U.S.C. § 2056(d)(2) (1976) (repealed 1981). See generally Scalia & Goodman, 
supra note 3, at 907, 911; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 58 (background discussion of possible 
agency contribution to offeror's cost). 
13. 15 U.S.C. § 2056(d)(3)(B) (1976) (repealed 1981). 
14. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 60. See generally Scalia & Goodman, supra note 3, at 
911-13 (background discussion of CPSA's leaving to CPSC judgment specifics of public 
participation). 
15. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 60. See generally infra note 28 and accompanying 
text (discussion of CPSA's silence regarding reimbursement for public participation). 
16. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 60. 
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 2056(b) (Supp. II 1972) (repealed 1981). 
18. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 60; Scalia & Goodman, supra note 3, at 916. 
19. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 60; Scalia & Goodman, supra note 3, at 908. 
20. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 60. 
21. See Tobias, supra note 2, at n.79 (discussion of dissatisfaction with the offeror 
process); Pub. L. No. 95-631, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 3742, 3742-43 (1978) (repealed 1981) (the 
1978 amendment). 
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Commission compensation of those that help the agency develop compul-
sory standards.22 
C. CPSC Implementation 
From 1974 until 1977, the CPSC paid entities that functioned as 
offerors and individual members of the public who assisted the offerors 
in developing proposed consumer product safety standards governing haz-
ards associated with seven consumer products.23 The offerors were two 
voluntary standards writing organizations, two consumer groups and three 
industry-oriented entities. 24 The individual citizens who aided the offerors 
primarily were representatives of regulated interests, 25 although a number 
of the persons, including technical consumers and "lay" consumers or 
product users, were not associated with industry.26 The seven products 
were architectural glass, power lawn mowers, matchbooks, swimming pool 
slides, television receivers (TVR), miniature Christmas tree lights (MCTL) 
and public playground equipment. The decision whether to pay individuals 
more than out-of-pocket costs was controversial.27 Thus, additional ex-
penses, such as lost wages, were covered in one proceeding, while negative 
resolution of the issue led the CPSC to reject an application submitted by 
a consumer organization which wished to serve as the offeror in a second 
22. See Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1203, 95 Stat. 703, 704-13 (1981), codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2056(a) (Supp. V 1981) (1981 abolition legislation); 15 U.S.C. § 2054(a)(4) (Supp. V 1981 
(funding provision); see also Tobias, supra note 2, at notes 91-92 and accompanying text 
(fiscal constraints imposed by decreased CPSC budget well may explain failure to invoke 
specific funding authority). See generally Klayman, Standard Setting Under the Consumer 
Product Safety Amendments of 1981-A Shift in Regulatory Philosophy, 51 GEO. WASH. 
L. REv. 96, 110 (1982) (analysis of 1981 amendment to CPSA). The only other federal 
legislation which provides for an offeror-like process is the Medical Device Amendments of 
1976. See 21 U.S.C. § 360d(c)(l) (1976). For an analysis of the legislative provision that 
compares it to CPSC's offeror process and which indicates that the Food and Drug 
Administration has been reluctant to apply the offeror-like mechanism, see Schwartz, 
Performance Standards Under the Medical Device Amendments: A Flawed Process in Need 
of Reform, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 318 (1984). 
23. The public playground equipment proceeding, which CPSC designated a "quasi-
offeror" proceeding, is considered an offeror proceeding in this Article. The chainsaw 
proceeding which might be considered a "quasi-offeror" proceeding is not so treated here. 
See generally Tobias, supra note 2, at § II.B.7. (analysis of chainsaw proceeding). 
24. The offerors were respectively ASTM and Underwriters Laboratory (UL), NCL 
and Consumers Union (CU), and the Consumer Safety Glazing Committee (CSGC), the 
National Swimming Pool Institute (NSPI) now re-named the National Spa and Pool Institute 
and the National Recreation and Parks Association (NRPA). 
25. The percentage of citizen representatives varied but usually comprised at least one-
third and often as much as two-thirds of the groups which developed the proposed standards. 
26. The technical consumers included engineers and physicians. The "lay" consumers 
included consumer advocates and homemakers. 
27. See Note, Inside the Proposed Standard for Architectural Glass: An Outward Look 
at Consumer Participation in the CPSA's Offeror Process, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1078, 
1175-96 (1975). 
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initiative.28 Widespread criticism of the offeror process prompted Congress 
to amend the mechanism in 1978; however, the agency did not employ 
the procedure thereafter, and it was abolished three years later. 29 
D. Prior Studies 
There are several analyses of the offeror process, but none evaluates 
closely the efficacy or quality of funded participation or operation of the 
mechanism itself in all of the CPSC's proceedings. During 1974 and 1975, 
a law student conducted a general examination of the architectural glazing 
initiative.30 The next year, the Commission's Office of Program Planning 
and Evaluation (OPPE) analyzed the efforts of the agency and of off er-
ors-not of individual citizens-and certain implications of the procedure, 
in the first four matters.31 A 1977 study undertaken by the Comptroller 
General32 and a 1978 Congressional report focused almost exclusively on 
the CPSC's institution and management of the offeror process and the 
difficulties that the agency encountered in its implementation.33 There is 
much Congressional testimony about the procedure and the seven pro-
ceedings. 34 During 1981, a consultant for the Administrative Conference 
of the United States (ACUS) completed a thoroughgoing evaluation of the 
work of the CPSC and the offeror as well as the process in the lawn 
mower initiative while summarily assessing these considerations in several 
other proceedings and the efforts of individuals in the lawn mower matter. 35 
In sum, several hundred individuals and organizations helped develop 
proposed consumer product safety standards in seven offeror initiatives 
of the Consumer Product Safety Commission. But neither the offeror 
28. See 43 Fed. Reg. 19, 136 (1978) (discussion of the first proceeding which was 
MCTL); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 66-68 (same); see also Note, supra note 27, at 1175-96 
(discussion of the second proceeding which was architectural glass). For full discussion of 
how individuals and entities involved in proposed standard development, indicating most 
pertinently that no public money was paid to employees of product manufacturers, see 
infra, note 63. 
29. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
30. See Note, supra note 27. 
31. See OFFICE OF PROGRAM PLANNING AND EVALUATION, CPSC, EVALUATION OF 
0FFEROR PROCESS (Nov. 5, 1976) [hereinafter OPPE REPORT]. 
32. COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION 
NEEDS TO ISSUE SAFETY STANDARDS FASTER (Dec. 12, 1977) [hereinafter GAO STUDY]. 
33. See H.R. REP. No. 1164, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. 
& ADMIN. NEWS 9434, 9452 [hereinafter HOUSE OFFEROR REPORT]. 
34. See, e.g., CPSC Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigation of the House <:;omm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 House Oversight Hearings]. 
35. See Schwartz, supra note 3. Cf. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards 
in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Health and Safety, 56 TEX. 
L. REv. 1329, 1399-1416 (1978) (ACUS consultant's evaluation of CPSC and offeror work 
in several proceedings in context of broader study); Meeting on Consumer Participation in 
Section 7 Proceedings, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 6, 1975) [hereinafter Consumer Participation 
Meeting] (participants' observations on consumer involvement in first offeror proceedings). 
1987] INSTRUCTIVE PRECURSOR 415 
mechanism nor much of this involvement has been analyzed carefully. 
Thus, it is important to evaluate rigorously the offeror process as well as 
contributions of citizens and offerors. 
II. AsSESSMENT OF OFFEROR PROCEEDINGS AT THE CONSUMER PRODUCT 
SAFETY COMMISSION 
A. Methodology 
It is difficult to analyze the CPSC's offeror initiatives. But the prob-
lems that I confronted in conducting the evaluation which follows and 
their resolution need be recounted only briefly here, principally because 
the methodology applied is similar in most significant respects to that I 
have employed before. 36 
Several reasons underlie the decision to assess the Commission's of-
feror process.37 Most importantly, the nature of offeror and citizen in-
volvement in the development of proposed consumer product safety 
standards and the character of the off eror procedure meant public partic-
ipation in the process and the device itself could be contrasted meaningfully 
with citizen activity in other proceedings38 and with more recently created 
decisional mechanisms, thus affording instructive insights for future ex-
perimentation. 39 The agency's experience with the offeror procedure pro-
vided numerous additional benefits. For example, there were few enough 
initiatives to permit detailed examination, but a sufficient number to allow 
effective comparison. However, analysis of experimentation at the CPSC 
did involve disadvantages and trade-offs. 40 
The contributions of individuals and offerors, primarily to develop-
ment of proposed standards but also to agency decisionmaking, will be 
considered input and evaluated in terms of efficacy and quality. 41 ''Effi-
cacy," which is employed synonymously with effectiveness and impact, 
asks whether the contributions of citizens and offerors had a salutary 
effect on decisional processes-both proposed standard development and 
subsequent Commission consideration.42 "Quality," which is less stringent 
36. See Tobias, supra note 2, at § II.A. One important difference is that I am analyzing 
the offeror process itself. 
37. See Tobias, supra note 2, at§ II.A.I. (discussion of advantages afforded by single 
agency analysis, especially at CPSC). 
38. See id. at § I.A.4., § B.2. (discussion of other funded citizen activity). 
39. See supra note 2; infra, §§ III., IV. 
40. For example, most of the proceedings commenced more than a decade ago. 
41. It is important to remember that there were two decisional processes: proposed 
standard development for which offerors had ultimate responsibility and CPSC consideration 
of the results of that effort over which the agency had authority. 
42. For example, did input force decisionmakers to treat more constructively questions 
at issue. See Tobias, supra note 2, at § 11.A.2.a. (more discussion of this term and other 
definitional approaches and difficulties); id. at § 11.A.2.b. (discussion of difficulties entailed 
in measuring efficacy). These are exacerbated by the factors mentioned, supra note 41. 
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and more subjective than efficacy, is nearly as important and as difficult 
to define. Quality considers how good the input was, implicating the 
validity of the views advanced and how they were advocated. 43 
In consulting sources of data on the input of individuals and offerors 
in the offeror process and on the offeror procedure itself, I attempted to 
consider, assemble and report as much information as practicable and, 
when limitations were encountered, to be as representative as possible. 
The potential sources were the studies mentioned above, twenty Congres-
sional hearings, the CPSC "files" and approximately one thousand persons 
familiar with the offeror process.44 I read all of the studies and hearings 
and relevant material listed in the index to each file. 45 Every pertinent 
reference to effectiveness or quality or to the offeror process that I found 
in these sources, notwithstanding reliability, is reported below. 46 Because 
so many people were familiar with the offeror proceedings, but most of 
the persons also had an interest in the initiatives and in the perceived 
efficacy and quality of citizen and offeror input, I sought the perspectives 
of a substantial, roughly equivalent number of people drawn from the 
three principal classifications of informed protagonists-CPSC, commer-
cial and nonregulated interests.47 The views were solicited by telephone, 
and those interviewed were asked the nature of their interest and their 
opinions of efficacy and quality and of the offeror procedure. 48 The data 
gleaned, regardless of dependability, are paraphrased or reported verbatim 
below. / 
I relied upon the material assembled to reach conclusions regarding 
the effectiveness and the quality of individual and offeror input.49 For 
each of the offeror initiatives, I reviewed all of the information collected. so 
First, I tried to formulate preliminary judgments by considering citizen 
43. See Tobias, supra note 2, at § II.A.2.a. (more discussion of this term). 
44. See supra notes 30-33, 35 and accompanying text (relating to studies); supra note 
34 and accompanying text (relating to hearings). The files that contain most of the data 
collected by CPSC are available at its Office of the Secretary (OS), 5401 Westbard, Bethesda, 
MD. See generally Tobias, supra note 2, at § II.A.2.c. (relating to persons familiar with 
the process). 
45. Whole files were not read because some were 20,000 pages and the endeavor did 
not seem cost-beneficial. 
46. See infra, § H.B. of this Article. This provides important advantages, such as 
transmission of raw data, free of value choices. See Tobias, supra note 2, at n.127 (listing 
other advantages). 
47. The crucial difficulty was how to maximize accuracy in terms of familiarity and 
potential prejudice. The approach attempts to guard against bias by offering some statistical 
validity and opportunities to contrast views articulated. See generally Tobias, supra note 2, 
at n.132; id. at n.131 (discussion of the protagonists). 
48. See id. at notes 133-36 and accompanying text (for more discussion of telephone 
interviewing). 
49. See infra, § III.A. of this Article; Tobias, supra note 2, at n.137-47 and accom-
panying text (more discussion of difficulties entailed in reaching such conclusions). 
50. This included data reported below and that not reported, such as legal questions 
at issue. 
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and offeror contributions and that material which offered no explicit 
opinion regarding the impact or quality of the input. si I then reviewed 
every opinion of the efficacy and quality of input, attempting to accord 
the opinion weight, premised on accuracy in terms of sources' objectivity 
and knowledge, using a number of factors.s2 The values initially assigned 
were modified as indicated in reaching final determinations.s3 
Moreover, I formulated conclusions about the offeror process. I re-
considered views expressed about that procedure by the sources mentioned 
above to ascertain whether the process itself had important implications 
for the perceived efficacy and quality of offeror and citizen involvement 
in it.54 These perspectives also were consulted in assessing the effectiveness 
of the process as a technique for developing standards, for making 
decisions and for resolving disputes, especially in contrast with other intra-
and extra-agency mechanisms for doing so, as well as in determining if 
lessons gleaned from the offeror experience might inform experimentation 
with more recently created approaches.ss 
The methodological complications examined above are the most sig-
nificant and problematic. Nonetheless, numerous additional difficulties, a 
number of which already were alluded to, attend attempts at "rigorous" 
assessment. 56 For instance, the question of priorities implicates matters 
such as the breadth and depth of evaluation. I tried to examine as 
stringently as possible as much offeror and citizen input throughout as 
much of the entire process as was feasible.5' Correspondingly, certain 
aspects of the analysis are limited by practical factors. One important 
factor is when to assess.ss Now that Congress has abolished the offeror 
process and some time has passed since most proceedings were conducted, 
it might not seem propitious to evaluate them. Ironically, passage of time, 
which yields a number of advantages-such as increased detachment-and 
other considerations, actually mean that today is quite appropriate. Indeed, 
revitalization of the offeror process, in the form of such widely heralded 
mechanisms as regulatory negotiation, makes the present auspicious, es-
pecially given the need for analysis that could facilitate improvement of 
51. This was never conclusive partly because there was so much input. 
52. These included theoretical, intangible and more pragmatic factors. See Tobias, 
supra note 2, at n.141-43 and accompanying text. 
53. Here I used the concepts of balance and consensus, more qualitative, subjective 
factors and gestalt judgments. See id. at n.144-47 and accompanying text. 
54. See infra, § III.A.2. of this Article. 
55. See infra, §§ III.A.2.-3.; III.B.; IV. of this Article. 
56. See Tobias, supra note 2, at § II.A.3. (listing additional complications); id. at § 
IV. (discussion of certain considerations entailed in rigorous analysis). 
57. I attempted to accord each of the seven proceedings roughly equal treatment. But 
I did make certain choices guided by factors such as relative significance of funded input 
to the proceeding in which it occurred. 
58. See Tobias, supra note 2, at notes 149-52 and accompanying text (more discussion 
of the timing issue). 
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the newer devices currently undergoing widespread experimentation.59 Ad-
ditional problems impede rigorous assessment, particularly the type of 
evaluation that I have recommended elsewhere for persons undertaking 
studies in the future. 60 However, all analyses have their limits, while the 
determination to assess the off eror process is reasonable, especially in light 
of ongoing and future work with similar techniques and their apparent 
promise.61 
B. Proceeding-Specific Assessment 
For all of the offeror proceedings, which are considered chronologi-
cally, I include descriptive evaluations of the initiatives and verbatim or 
paraphrased opinions, 62 and my assessments, of the efficacy and quality 
of government sponsored public involvement. The contributions of indi-
vidual citizens and of offerors, 63 principally to proposed standard devel-
opment but secondarily to Commission decisionmaking, will be treated as 
input and analyzed in terms of effectiveness and quality. 
1. Architectural Glazing 
In August, 1974, the CPSC selected the Consumer Safety Glazing 
Committee (CSGC) as the offeror to develop requirements for treating 
hazards associated with architectural glass.64 The Committee, a "group of 
industry, labor and general interest groups" formed to lobby for state 
model safety glazing legislation, had petitioned the CPSC to adopt a 
mandatory standard in June, 1973.65 But the CSGC was chosen only after 
the organization revised its original application and agency negotiations 
59. See supra, notes 1-2. 
60. See Tobias, supra note 2, at n.156 (sources cited define the problems); id. at § 
IV. (defining the prescriptions). 
61. It also is realistic and worthwhile to evaluate funded involvement in the process 
and to collect systematically data on compensated activity, especially for purposes of 
comparison with other such activity and related mechanisms. See generally id. at notes 158-
60 and accompanying text. 
62. To preserve the confidentiality of CPSC officials, compensated entities, and people 
I interviewed, most persons whose opinions are reported are identified by numbers for each 
initiative. This journal's editors are relying upon me to verify the opinions. Most interviews 
were held in 1983 and 1984. Inquiries as to sources should be directed to me. 
63. Most citizens were not paid directly by the agency but by offerors from CPSC 
lump sum payments to them or from offerors' resources. I believe that no employees of 
product manufacturers were paid any public money. The input of individuals, however 
funded out of public money, is evaluated below. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 64 n.223 • 
(amounts CPSC paid offerers). 
64. See 41 Fed. Reg. 6178, 6178 (1976); cf. id. at 6178-79; OPPE REPORT, supra note 
31, at D-1 to D-9 (discussions of proceeding); Note, supra note 27 (same, focusing on 
consumer participation). 
65. 41 Fed. Reg. 6178, 6178 (1976). Cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 56 n.168; Note, 
supra note 27, at 1173-76 (discussion of CSGC and members' interests in standard devel-
opment and CSGS's prior efforts in area). 
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with another entity, the National Consumers League, reached an impasse 
over the issue of financing non-commercial involvement in proposed stand-
ard development. 66 Funded citizens comprised approximately one-third of 
the people who worked with the CSGC.67 The offeror was granted one 
time extension68 and submitted its recommendations to the CPSC during 
January, 1975.69 Commission staff modified considerably the suggestions 
prof erred by the CSGC, 10 and the agency published a proposed rule in 
February, 1976.71 Eleven months later, the CPSC issued a final regulation 
said to resemble, but lack the clarity of, a voluntary standard which the 
Commission already had found deficient. 72 There is widespread agreement 
that this was one of the least successful offeror initiatives;73 the rule did 
not completely withstand judicial scrutiny74 and has been revised contin-
ually. 75 
Many have criticized the efforts of the CSGC. The Chairman of the 
National Commission on Product Safety accused the offeror of tendering 
a "weaker standard than that proposed by the voluntary sector [, afford-
ing] less protection to the consumer than he could have had at no cost. " 76 
66. See Note, supra note 27, at 1175-96 (discussion of CSOC's selection); see also 
Hearings on Regulatory Reform Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of 
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. IV, 
342-64 (1976) [hereinafter Regulatory Reform Hearings] (Commissioners' Opinions on ne-
gotiations with National Consumers League). 
67. See Note, supra note 27, at 1196-1202 (discussion of the consumers, their selection, 
backgrounds and participation). 
68. See 40 Fed. Reg. 10, 227 (1975). See generally Note, supra note 27, at 1204-05 
(discussion of time extension). 
69. See Current Report, 3 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 100, 100 (Jan. 31, 1975). 
70. See 42 Fed. Reg. 6178, 6178-87 (1976); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 88 n.419 and 
accompanying text. 
71. See 41 Fed. Reg. 6178, 6181-87 (1976); cf. id. at 6178-87 (discussion of some 
CPSC modifications in CSGC's recommendations). 
72. See 42 Fed. Reg. 1428, 1441 (1977), codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ 1201.1-1201.7 (1983) 
(final rule); cf. Hearings on Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appro-
priations for 1980 Before the Subcomm. on HUD-Indep. Agencies of the Senate Appro-
priations Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 82 (1979) [hereafter 1980 Senate Appropriations 
Hearings] (statement of Senator Proxmire); Telephone interviews (Tis) with industry repre-
sentatives 1, 2 (final rule's unclear nature). 
73. See, e.g., 1980 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 72, at 82-84 (statement 
of Senator Proxmire); I977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 285 (statement of 
Comm'r Pittle); Pittle, The Restricted Regulator, 12 ThIAL 18, 27 (May 1976); Tis, supra 
note 72. 
74. See ASG Indus., Inc. v. CPSC, 593 F.2d 1323, 1337 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 864 (1979). 
75. See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 57,383, 57,383 (1980); 43 Fed. Reg. 57,244, 57,594 (1978). 
See generally CPSC Reauthorization: Hearings on H.R. 2271 and H.R. 2201 Before the 
Subcomm. on Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 345-46 (1981) [hereinafter H.R. 2271 Hearings] (statement of Acting 
Chairman Statler). Indeed, these revisions have continued until quite recently. See, e.g., 49 
Fed. Reg. 15,256, 15,256 (1984); 48 Fed. Reg. 20,762, 20,762 (1983). 
76. Comment from Arnold Elkind to CPSC, reprinted in Current Report, 3 Prod. 
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Employees of the CPSC with line responsibility for reviewing the CSGC's 
submission expressed concern that it was not as technically accurate as 
feasible or as responsible as possible to requirements in the agency's 
NOP. 77 The authors of the OPPE Report and numerous additional per-
sonnel at the CPSC agreed with one Commissioner that the offeror's 
suggestions were "nothing more than'warmed over' versions of voluntary 
standards previously determined to be inadequate by the Commission,'' 
so that agency staff had to revise substantially the recommendations.78 
Moreover, a CPSC medical officer said that the submission provided by 
the CSGC lacked scientific support and that the offeror never correlated 
the "human factors" in glass injuries,79 while the agency's Project Monitor 
asserted that many CSGC members desired regulation for commercial 
reasons and that the off eror "pulled the wool over the eyes of" the 
reimbursed individuals. so 
In fairness to the CSGC, although the staff of the CPSC criticized 
strongly, and altered significantly the CSGC's proposal, the offeror's 
suggestion differed minimally from the agency's final rule.81 Perhaps most 
telling was the Commissioners' decision to discontinue consideration of 
the risks presented by windows,82 even though a principal criticism of the 
CSGC was the offeror's failure to treat these dangers.83 Moreover, much 
responsibility for perceived deficiencies in CSGC's performance can be 
assigned to the CPSC. Two Commissioners admitted that the instructions 
initially provided the Committee might have been unclear. 84 The CPSC 
broadly defined the hazards to be addressed, and there were no readily 
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 57, 57 (Jan. 17, 1975) and in Note, supra note 27, at 1204 
n.180. 
77. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 6-11, D-8; GAO STUDY, supra note 32, at 
24; Note, supra note 27, at 1204-05 n.182-83; accord Hearings on S.644 and S.1000 Before 
the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
92 (1975) [hereinafter S.644 Hearings] (statement of David Swankin). 
78. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-7; Tis with CPSC employees 1-3; see also 
Pittle, supra note 73, at 17,18 (relating to Commissioner's views); Implementation of the 
CPSA: Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 
Science and Transp., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (Apr. 1977) [hereinafter Apr. 1977 Senate 
Oversight Hearings] (same); Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 66, at 34 (statements 
of Comm'r Pittle). 
79. An important "human factor" was failure to see a glass door. TI with CPSC 
employee 1, supra note 78. Cf. OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 6-11 (CSGC assertion that 
relationship between certain hazards and human-glass impacts was developed by offeror, 
but CPSC evaluators' assertion that relationship based on insufficient data and deficient 
engineering analysis). 
80. TI with CPSC employee 2, supra note 78. 
81. See 42 Fed. Reg. 1428, 1428 (1977); TI with industry representative 1, supra note 
72; Tl with CPSC employee 2, supra note 78. 
82. See GAO STUDY, supra note 32, at 24; 41 Fed. Reg. 6178, 6178 (1976); OPPE 
REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-7. 
83. See supra notes 70-71. 
84. See S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 250-52 (statements of Chairman Simpson 
and Comm'r Newman). 
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available remedies for some of the risks presented. 85 Indeed, the offeror 
claimed that a reasonable standard could have been promulgated three 
years earlier had the CPSC restricted standard development to the issues 
identified in the petition submitted originally by the CSGC. 86 Insufficient 
injury data existed which meant that the offeror had to spend resources 
developing and assembling information. 87 The agency afforded little guid-
ance, assuming a "hands-off" approach throughout the proposed standard 
development process, 88 but severely criticized the end product tendered by 
the CSGC when the CPSC may have lacked the requisite expertise to 
assess it. 89 Of course, much of the difficulty experienced may be attrib-
utable to the fact that the architectural glazing proceeding was the. first 
initiative in which the agency was experimenting with an entirely new 
administrative procedure. 
Moreover, some assessments of CSGC were positive. Several CPSC 
employees were impressed more favorably by the offeror. One staff mem-
ber thought that the CSGC "assembled a number of fairly good ideas, 
worked well with building code groups," and developed a high quality 
standard.90 Another agency official believed that the offeror's prior ex-
perience with state legislatures enabled it to run a "pretty smooth opera-
tion" but imposed certain constraints,91 while a third staffer said that 
CSGC's "work was generally okay."92 Finally, manufacturing represen-
85. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 65 n.231 and accompanying text; Hearings on Dep't 
of Housing and Urban Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropriations for 1978 Before the Subcomm. 
on HUD-Indep. Agencies of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 
pt. 2, 1707 (1977) [hereinafter 1978 Senate Appropriations Hearings]; GAO STUDY, supra 
note 32, at 24-25; OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-7. 
86. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-7. 
87. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 65 n.233; GAO STUDY, supra note 32, at 32; OPPE 
REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-13. 
88. TI with industry representative 3; TI with CPSC employee 4; Schwartz, supra note 
3, at 64 n.228; Apr. 1977 Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 78, at 125, 127 (statements 
of Comm'rs Kushner and Pittle). 
89. Tis with industry representative 2, supra note 72; TI with industry representative 
3, supra note 88. The first person interviewed added that the need "to educate CPSC 
personnel and public participants" meant standard development consumed "twice as much 
time as it would have without them" and that the "standard which CPSC came up with 
was awful [principally] because it did not listen to industry." Id.; cf. TI with industry 
representative 5 (much initial staff turnover, much unsubstantiated CPSC criticism of CSGC's 
work, and "Commissioners need to put fingerprints" on standard created delay). Other 
industry representatives echoed these, and voiced additional criticisms, of CPSC's perform-
ance; accord OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 4-5, 6-11 to 6-13; Note, supra note 27, at 
1199-1200. 
90. TI with CPSC employee 5. 
91. TI with CPSC employee 6. The official added that the prior experience enabled 
CSGC's members to ascertain precisely the impact of specific requirement's imposition and 
meant accommodations reached earlier affected standard development; that "there was a 
lot of floundering at the beginning;" and that "marketing people and attorneys" who 
represented CSGC members were "not in touch with fairly common research data and 
techniques." Id. 
92. TI with CPSC employee 4, supra note 88. 
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tatives have been comparatively positive. One industry employee observed 
that the CSGC "did the best job that it could given its working relationship 
with the Commission, " 93 and a second representative of producers stated 
that the "offeror process yielded reasonable results and was fair and well 
run [, affording] the public ample opportunity to participate. " 94 
Compensated individuals' input is difficult to analyze, but their con-
tributions were variable. Because citizens "did not act in concert," an 
extra-agency evaluator had problems assessing their ''impact on the final 
result."95 The Project Monitor for the CPSC remarked that "consumer 
participation was valuable" 96 and that "technical experts actually exerted 
considerable influence at meetings"97 but that citizens were "probably 
disadvantaged by lack of organization" and that a "stronger standard 
might have resulted had the consumer interest been articulated by skilled 
consumer advocates."98 The monitor also found that the CSGC may have 
deceived technical and lay individuals;99 technical people "did not have 
glass expertise" and lay consumers were not helpful because they "lacked 
the technical know-how to cut through manufacturers' representations." 100 
Another CPSC officer believed that citizens "asked reasonable questions, 
were quite perceptive and caught on quickly," although members of the 
public were unfamiliar with the technology. 101 But a third Commission 
employee thought that the consumer involvement in the architectural 
glazing proceeding was not a "terribly good example of public participa-
tion." 102 
Numerous industry-oriented observers were critical. The first project 
manager for the CSGC considered citizens a "hindrance," facetiously 
93. TI with industry representative 3, supra note 88. CPSC failed to "participate as 
much as it should have in the overall process" and to provide sufficient data while remaining 
too "aloof." Id. 
94. Tl with industry representative 5, supra note 89. The representative added "three 
people in a room could have drafted as fair a standard in a day and a half" but the person 
thought that the process was necessary for insuring public confidence and industry compliance 
while suggesting that existing standards should "serve as a model for CPSC." Id. 
95. Note, supra note 27, at 1199 n.161 and accompanying text. "If the consumers had 
organized ... their influence might have been greater." Id. at 1200 n.168. See id. at 1196-
1202 (additional observations). 
96. Note, supra note 27, at 1205 n.184. 
97. Id. at 1200 n.167. 
98. See id. at text accompanying note 167 (appearance of first observation); id. at 
1205 n.184 (appearance of second observation). The observer also "characterized the con-
sumer participants as primarily another set of people with brains, and not necessarily 
representative of a specific point of view" and "described the consumers' responsibilities 
as injecting a nontechnical viewpoint into the development of the safety glazing standard 
and ensuring the openness, and, therefore, the credibility of the proceedings." Id. at 1200 
n.167. 
99. TI, with CPSC employee 2, supra note 78. 
100. Id. 
IOI. TI with CPSC employee 6, supra note 91. 
102. Tl with CPSC employee 5, supra note 90. 
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remarking that they were so effective that he resigned. 103 A second person 
associated with manufacturers found that consumer involvement essentially 
was "detrimental to arriving at a good, workable standard expeditiously," 
because of the time devoted necessarily to educating lay people. 104 A lawyer 
who challenged the glass rule in court claimed that individuals lacked the 
"technical background to be any real help in developing a standard that 
was very technical. " 105 A fourth observer said that a "number of con-
sumers clearly never understood what was going on" but "others took 
the time to investigate, became very knowledgeable and did an excellent 
job once they got over the original education hurdle." 106 Additional 
manufacturing representatives were more positive. Counsel for the CSGC 
stated that citizens "were dedicated, contributed substantially and became 
very conversant with the product and articulate about modes of injury." 107 
One industry employee commented that individuals brought to discussions 
"much practical insight" that producers even lacked and "questioned 
more data than anyone. else,"108 while a second manufacturing represent-
ative found "really refreshing the different viewpoint and interplay" 
provided by the public. 109 An evaluator not aligned with commercial 
interests asserted that "industry representatives generally were impressed 
with the consumers, noting that they often helped resolve conflicts between 
industry members." 110 Nonetheless, few persons associated with producers 
whom I interviewed mentioned the second factor. 
In response to a questionnaire distributed by the assessor mentioned 
immediately above, most funded individuals said that citizens "represented 
a unique viewpoint," frequently helping to settle manufacturer infight-
ing. m "Each person felt that he or she had influenced significantly the 
course of the development proceeding."112 However, a number of these 
103. TI with industry representative 1, supra note 72. 
104. Tl with industry representative 2, supra note 72. The representative added that the 
"administrative committee spent most of its time educating the lay people [who were five 
years behind the industry} so that they would make the right decisions," and that standard 
development "took twice as long" because of public participation. Id. 
105. TI with industry representative 4. 
106. TI with industry representative 5, supra note 89. The representative added that 
"none of the consumers knew anything initially about the problem or the process," that 
much time was consumed "bringing them up to speed," and that citizens "were at a 
disadvantage all along" with industry but "did an excellent job for the limited experience 
and information they had at the time." Id. 
107. TI with industry representative 6. The representative added that citizens were 
"pretty sophisticated and not dependent on manufacturers, did their homework," attempted 
to learn as much as possible about the glass industry and attended all meetings. Id. 
108. TI with industry representative 3, supra note 88. The representative added that the 
consumers' "realism" pleasantly surprised him and others, and that "public participation 
was absolutely essential" and should be integral to future, similar endeavors. Id. 
109. Tl with industry representative 7. 
110. Note, supra note 27, at 1200. 
111. Id. at 1202. 
112. Id. 
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people were much less "satisfied with their performance and influence" 
than participants in the subsequent proceeding involving matchbooks where 
citizens were more organized.113 Moreover, some thought that "consumers 
had not greatly influenced the final standard" but these observers offered 
no explanation for this view . 114 Reimbursed parties also provided their 
impressions in an August, 1975 meeting convened by the Commissioners 
to evaluate the effectiveness of citizen participation in the initial four 
offeror proceedings and the efficacy of the process itself. Many funded 
citizens believed that individuals were disadvantaged vis-a-vis manufactur-
ers and, thus, had to rely on them for technical expertise and data. m But 
lay participants were less troubled about this than technically proficient 
citizens. 116 One such person, an architect who was familiar with glass 
production, needed 90 days to understand the vocabulary and found that 
most consumers lacked the "technical skills to even argue some" questions 
until the very end of ·the process, citing as an example data that were 
available to industry at the onset which individuals acquired in the fifth 
month after wasting sixty days arguing over issues which the data clearly 
resolved. " 117 A second technical person observed that he "was hunting 
for information, working and pushing and prying here and there in the 
industry to get what information" he could during the project's early 
phase.118 Several others thought that citizens had little impact, 119 while 
nearly everyone reiterated criticisms relating to the CPSC120 and the dearth 
of time provided for completion of the work. 121 
2. Power Lawn Mowers 
In September, 1974, the CPSC chose Consumers Union (CU), a 
nonprofit "consumer product evaluation and consumer advocacy organi-
zation," to devise requirements for risks presented by power lawn mow-
ers.122 CU was selected, after agreeing to certain agency suggestions regarding 
public participation. 123 The Commission chose the group over the Outdoor 
Power Equipment Institute (OPE!), a trade association which had peti-
113. Id. at 1209 n.199 and accompanying text. 
114. Id. at 1202. 
115. See Consumer Participation Meeting, supra note 35. 
116. See, e.g., id. at 25,26. Perhaps lay participants had less appreciation of the 
problems. 
117. See id. at 51. 
118. See id. at 99. 
119. See, e.g., id. at 97, 131. 
120. See, e.g., id. at 98, 173. 
121. See, e.g., id. at 51-52, 145. 
122. See 39 Fed. Reg. 37,803, 37,803 (1974); OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-29; 
Schwartz, supra note 3, at 79; cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 77-95; OPPE REPORT, supra 
at D-28-39 (discussions of proceeding). 
123. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 79-80 (discussion of CU's modifications, at CPSC 
behest, in the consumer participation provisions of its offer); OPPE REPORT, supra note 
31, at D-29-30 (same); Note, supra note 27, at 1207-08 (same). 
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tioned CPSC to commence the proceeding in August, 1973. 124 CU ap-
pointed twenty-four manufacturing and twenty-one consumer representatives 
to eight subcommittees. 125 Nonetheless, there was much disparity between 
industry and citizen involvement, a discrepancy that was exacerbated over 
time as requirements to be imposed on manufacturers appeared to be 
crystallizing and more producers came to appreciate their potential import 
and as a decreasing number of individuals could afford to participate. 126 
Over twenty meetings were held in the initial two months of what 
became a very complex project, 127 and CU wrote four drafts before 
tendering its suggestions to the CPSC in July, 1975. 128 The agency reviewed 
and revised the recommendations over a twenty-two month period, inten-
sively analyzing them, 129 developing different or novel requirements, and 
assessing input of diverse entities.13° In May, 1977, CPSC issued a com-
prehensive proposed standard that deleted some suggestions made by CU 
and modified many other offeror recommendations. 131 The agency docu-
ment received 117 comments132 and was criticized severely by interests as 
disparate as the OPE!, which asserted that the proposal ratified the "least 
desirable aspects" of CU's submission while adopting-without "support 
or guidance-new and untried requirements"133 and CU, which found its 
124. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 56 n.168 and accompanying text (discussion of the 
proceeding's background and OPEI's commencement of it); OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, 
at D-28-29 (same); 39 Fed. Reg. 37,803, 37,803 (1974) (same); cf. Schwartz, supra at 78-80 
(discussion of controversial selection process); OPPE REPORT, supra at D-29-30 (same); 
Note, supra note 27, at 1208 n.192 (same). 
125. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-31; id. at D-30 to 32 (discussion of the 
structure, function, and workings of these subcommittees and initiation of standard devel-
opment); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 80-82 (same). 
126. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 82; OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-31; cf. 
infra note 173 and accompanying text ("95 percent of the opinions expressed at committee 
meetings were controlled or dominated by industry people"). 
127. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 81. 
128. See id. at 81-2; Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1413 n.280; cf. Schwartz, supra, note 
3, at 81-82 (discussion of drafts' formulation); id. at 83-85 (concise summary of CU's 
proposal). 
129. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 85-87. 
130. See 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 353 (statement of Professor 
Hamilton) (relating to developing standards); OPEI Position Paper on CPSC Proposed 
Mandatory Safety Standard for Power Lawn Mowers (Staff Draft #4 Mar. 3, 1977), reprinted 
in id. [hereinafter OPEI Position Paper] (same); cf. Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1413 n.280; 
Schwartz, supra note 3, at 87-88 (discussions of position paper). CPSC's "initial in-depth 
review of the offeror's proposal and the subsequent development of numerous new or 
different requirements [consumedi more time than expected, due to the number, complexity, 
and controversial nature of the standard's requirements." Schwartz, supra at 88. See id. at 
86, 88 (relating to assessing input); cf. id. at 85-89 (discussion of evaluation phase). 
131. See 42 Fed. Reg. 23,052, 23,052-72 (1977); cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 87-88 
(concise summary of proposed regulation and comparison of it with CU's suggestions). 
132. See 42 Fed. Reg. 34,892 (1977); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 89 n.425 and accom-
panying text. 
133. See OPEI Position Paper, supra note 130, at 3. 
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work so altered that it sought compensation to comment. 134 A Commission 
hearing on the proposal was held in June, 1977, and three people involved 
in the proposed standard development stage were funded to speak. 135 
During review of public comment, the CPSC staff found that the input 
raised 700 issues, recognized that the endeavor "had become unmanage-
able," and recommended that its scope be circumscribed sharply .136 The 
Commissioners agreed with the staff suggestion, 137 solicited written input 
on narrower requirements, 138 and conducted a December, 1978, hearing 
which one citizen was paid to attend. 139 the CPSC held many open meetings 
on its revised standard during the next two months140 and promulgated a 
final rule in February, 1979, that differed significantly from its proposal 
and included few of CU's original ideas. 141 Although the Commission 
regulation survived judicial challenge, 142 Congress postponed its effective 
date and instructed the CPSC to implement a suggestion unsuccessfully 
championed by industry throughout the lawn mower initiative. 143 
This was the longest, most difficult, offeror proceeding as well as the 
one in which the CPSC attempted to regulate the most complex product. 
Id. 
[I]ntroduction of a novel foot probe' allegedly had 'neither the endorsement of 
CU nor . . . any industry verified grounding in population statistics or modes of 
operator behavior [while a] new thrown objects test [allegedly departed] in material 
ways from the recommendations of the Commission's own contractor .. : . 
134. See Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1413 n.280; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 88 n.417, 
89 n.422 and accompanying text; see also 42 Fed. Reg. 34,892, 34,892-93 (1977). 
135. See 42 Fed. Reg. 34,892, 34,893 (1977); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 89; Hearings 
on Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropriations for 1979 Before the 
Subcomm. on HUD-Indep. Agencies of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 
2d Sess., pt. 2, 264 (1978) [hereinafter 1979 Senate Appropriations Hearings]. 
136. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 89-90. CPSC staff recommended that the scope be 
narrowed to the blade-contact hazard. Id. at 89. 
137. See id. at 89-90; see also 43 Fed. Reg. 24,697, 23,697-98 (1978). 
138. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 90; see also 43 Fed. Reg. 51,038, 51,038 (1978). 
139. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 90; see also 43 Fed. Reg. 55,771, 55,772 (1978). 
140. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 90. 
141. See 44 Fed. Reg. 9990, 9990-10,037 (1979). Compare id. with 42 Fed. Reg. 23,052, 
23,052-72 (1977) and the concise summary of CU's recommendations in Schwartz, supra 
note 3, at 83-85. Cf. Schwartz, supra, at 90-92 (discussion of final rule and comparison 
with CPSC's proposal and CU's recommendations). 
142. See Southland Mower Co. v. CPSC, 619 F.2d 499, 526 (5th Cir. 1980). The Fifth 
Circuit in Southland Mower held only that "part of the standard requiring the discharge-
chute area of power lawn mowers to pass a foot-probe test" was unsupported by substantial 
evidence. Id. at 510. See generally Schwartz, supra note 3, at 92-93; Klayman, supra note 
22, at 107-08 (more discussion of final standard and court challenge). 
143. See Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. 
L. No. 96-526, 94 Stat. 3044, 3050 (1980) (relating to congressional postponement); cf. 
Hearings on Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.-Indep. Agencies of the House Appropri-
ations Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, 809 (1981) [hereinafter 1982 House Appropri-
ations Hearings] (statement of Rep. Boland) (postponement premised on industry production 
cycle). See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 93-94 nn.477-78 and accompanying text (sources cited 
discuss congressional instruction); cf. id. at 94 (subsequent history). 
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The initiative was plagued by every problem that afflicted the other 
proceedings and a number of its own, especially constant disagreement 
over the technological feasibility of proposals; incessant, vigorous oppo-
sition engendered by the cost of recommended remedies; and the virtual 
impossibility of securing consensus between the "consumer-oriented of-
feror" and the industry, which were "poles apart on fundamental is-
sues." 144 
Agency personnel accorded the offeror's work considerable, but qual-
ified, praise. Several made general laudatory comments, saying that CU 
was "incredibly effective" in that the offeror "got pretty much what it 
wanted;" 145 "did an excellent job;"146 and was "technically qualified to 
run" the project as well as "was very knowledgeable about lawn mow-
ers. "147 
Others associated with the Commission have been more specific. The 
preliminary staff evaluation stated that CU's "standard and accompanying 
documents appeared" responsive to the CPSC's requirements, and that 
CU treated "all hazards listed in the NOP, essentially addressed all 
inadequacies in existing standards," and provided all necessary docu-
ments.148 But the offeror's submission also was so complex that the staff 
requested more time to analyze the material tendered. 149 
An agency official found that CU did "one of the best jobs of seeing 
the problem and correcting it [, producing] a very good package and 
technical rationale," assuming that the offeror's view of risk was accu-
rate.150 The Project Monitor for the Commission was "very impressed 
with the technical unfolding of the effort" and observed that the offeror 
effectively managed the endeavor, assembled ''very savvy . technical peo-
ple," promoted "good technical interchange" and coordinated new test-
ing.151 However, the agency official thought that CU's "staff was'drifting' 
and'planning poorly' "at first but "solved many of its organizational 
144. See id. at 95. It also could be argued that CPSC created more problems than it 
remedied. See, e.g., infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text. 
145. Tl with CPSC employee 1. 
146. TI with CPSC employee 2. 
147. TI with CPSC employee 3. 
148. OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-36. CU "addressed all hazards listed in the 
NOP, essentially addressed all inadequacies in existing standards as listed in the NOP [, 
and] provided all documents required or promised." Id.; accord Schwartz, supra note 3, at 
83 & 85. 
149. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 85. 
150. TI with CPSC employee 4. The official added that CU did a "pretty straightforward 
job of seeing the problem and correcting it as best it could [but] later most of the civilized 
world saw the world differently than CU had, so maybe CU saw it wrong" and that many 
deficiencies in the offeror process make it very unfair to judge funded participation on the 
basis of offerors' work products. Id. 
151. TI with CPSC employee 5. "Old enemies cooperated under the aegis of CU to 
develop a new test method for evaluating thrown objects" and a "good deal of what was 
in the proposed and final standard was what CU wanted." Id. 
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problems," received greater industry cooperation, and "made substantial 
progress" subsequently. 152 The monitor also believed that the offeror "tried 
to do too much by treating all possible risks, " 153 even though he acknowl-
edged that "CU probably would have done a better job if the CPSC had 
initially focused the hazards." 154 Another staffer commented that the 
offeror's standard was "not totally adequate to address the issues [and] 
did not push industry enough, " 155 while a medical officer said that CU 
treated "major safety facets," although the CPSC had to so some "fine 
tuning and a lot of independent research. " 156 
The study conducted by the OPPE stated that all risks were treated 
by the offeror but that large inefficient meetings hindered early progress 
of proposed standard development and that there was insufficient infor-
mation flow among subcommittees as well as participatory imbalance. 157 
The report also blamed the CPSC for some perceived deficiencies in the 
standard development effort. The agency asked CU to address too many 
hazards, especially ones for which there was limited documentable data 
on injuries, while the CPSC failed to specify risks to be treated and 
possible ways of handling them, to consider comprehensively existing data 
and voluntary standards, and to provide clear guidance on citizen involve-
ment.158 
Four Commissioners identified these and the CPSC's "inadequate 
front end analysis" and "hands-off" approach to, and adversarial rela-
tionship with, offerors as "major problems which plagued the offeror 
process" initially.159 One Chairman acknowledged that the Commissioners 
bit "off more than we could reasonably chew in a reasonable time and 
[often were] gagging on the magnitude of" the lawn mower project,160 
while another agency head testified that the CPSC first tried "to build 
the perfect power mower" but finally addressed the "most important 
152. See Note, supra note 27, at 1208 n.192. An extra-agency evaluator who interviewed 
the project monitor said that "much of CU's early difficulty was due to industry's refusal 
to cooperate fully with the CU staff." Id. 
153. TI with CPSC employee 5, supra note 151. 
154. Id.; accord infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text. 
155. TI with CPSC employee 6. 
156. TI with CPSC employee 7. 
157. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-31-32 & 36. 
158. See id. at 3-3, 3-22; 4-3 to 4-4, 4-22; 13-1-2. 
159. See Reauthorization of CPSA: Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of 
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 199-201, 208 
(1978) [hereinafter S.2796 Hearings] (statement of Chairman Byington); Hearings on Dep't 
of Housing and Urban Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropriations for 1978 Before the Subcomm. 
on HUD-Indep. Agencies of the House Appropriations Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 
4, 113-20 (1977) [hereinafter 1978 House Appropriations Hearings] (statements of Byington, 
Comm'rs Kushner, Franklin & Pittle). 
160. Hearings on Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropriations 
for 1979 Before the Subcomm. on HUD-Indep. Agencies of the House Appropriations 
Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, 461 (1978) [hereinafter 1979 House Appropriations 
Hearings] (statement of Chairman Byington). 
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single hazard." 161 Indeed, continual narrowing of the initiative's scope 
may well attest to deficiencies in agency management. 162 
The Commissioners have said little about the work of CU. One 
Chairman characterized the offeror' s suggestions as "regulatory overkill," 
due to the cost of a mechanism that CU recommended and the inclusion 
in the offeror's submission of noise requirements absent supporting data. 163 
A second chairman added that CU covered many risks so that CPSC had 
to "define and narrow down the specific hazards" to be treated.164 Finally, 
most of these assessors and others recognized that the statutory time 
allotted for proposed standard development was woefully insufficient. 165 
Several reimbursed individuals who possessed technical expertise praised 
CU while criticizing agency management and industry recalcitrance. One 
of the technical experts remarked that the "offeror's work was generally 
very good," that the CPSC staff believed that it was "really not supposed 
to actively participate," and that "manufacturers fought regulation tooth 
and nail.'' 166 A physician agreed that the people and entities involved in 
proposed standard development would debate for hours and need guidance 
which CPSC monitors refused to provide and that industry retained much 
expertise and data "subsequently used to oppose the standard." 167 A 
mechanical engineer said that CU's manager "did an outstanding job of 
pulling everything together," in light of the CPSC' s inexperience, "hands-
off'' posture, and failure to secure necessary material as well as producers' 
refusal to supply such data or to cooperate in other ways.168 Another 
person with technical skills was amazed that CU could provide any 
documentation and stated that the offeror "did a reasonably good job," 
given the substantial "organization industry had, and money it spent, to 
block standard development at every avenue" and agency inability to 
"match producers' firepower or stonewalling. " 169 A fifth person thought 
161. 1980 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 72, at 55 (statement of Chairman 
King). 
162. Continual narrowing has been traced most comprehensively in Schwartz, supra 
note 3, at 85-92. 
163. See S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 251 (statement of Chairman Simpson). 
164. See S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 200 (statement of Chairman Byington). 
165. See, e.g., id. at 208 (same); GAO STUDY, supra note 32, at App. I, p. 41 (CPSC 
Response to GAO Study); House Offeror Report, supra note 33, at 7; cf. S. 2796 Hearings, 
supra, note 159, at 21-22 (statement of Robert Goldstone); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 95 
(statutory preference for performance, rather than design, requirements caused delay). 
166. TI with funded participant I. 
167. See S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 29, 33 (statement of Robert Goldstone). 
168. TI with funded participant 2. The party identified the difficulty of securing 
necessary data from industry as a "significant handicap" for technical consumers and CU 
and added that the "proceeding should be put in context" as one of the first in which 
CPSC was experimenting with the innovative offeror process. 
169. TI with funded participant 3. The party said that CU deserved a "B" grade for 
its efforts; that the "amount of organization which industry had, and the amount of money 
it spent, to fight the effort were beyond comprehension," and that a number of the CPSC 
technical people were the "least qualified." Id. 
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that CU tendered an "excellent proposal which treated all hazards" and 
that its decisional process was "reasonably fair." 110 
Three CU employees concurred in some of the observations afforded 
by the technical consumers. The Project Director found that the hardest 
risks "to justify and remedy" were those documented least by the CPSC, 171 
which supplied in-depth investigations supporting half the hazards and no 
record of noise injuries; 172 that "ninety-five percent of the opinions ex-
pressed at committee meetings were controlled" by representatives of 
producers, some of whom continuously opposed provisions designed to 
"reduce blade stopping time;" and that the offeror's proposal was "nec-
essarily a compromise with industry. " 173 A second official employed by 
CU admitted that the offeror experienced difficulty securing industry 
cooperation174 and agency data. 175 The officer also claimed that the CPSC 
afforded inadequate guidance and that its statute provided insufficient 
time for proposed standard development. 176 But the individual described 
the effort as a learning process because for the first time many people, 
"with very different interests, had to ... hammer out a standard." 177 A 
third employee of the offeror conceded that CU may have provided too 
many options and reiterated that the CPSC could have better managed 
the endeavor and that the agency offered too little guidance, especially 
regarding the Commissioners' expectations. 178 
Many industry representatives criticized CU's efforts .and CPSC's 
administration, albeit for numerous reasons different than those enumer-
ated above.179 Those involved in lawn mower production evinced concern 
principally about agency failure to consider adequately voluntary stand-
ards, to discuss constructively possible requirements, and to educate suf-
170. TI with funded participant 4. The party added that CU's standard had "maybe 
even been too broad." Id. 
171. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-3 to 3-4. 
172. See id.; TI with Bertram Strauss, CU Project Director. 
173. See Deposition of Bertram Strauss, p. 209 (source of the material in the first 
quotation), Greenwood v. McDonough Power Equip., 437 F. Supp. 707 (D. Kan. 1977), 
reprinted in Schroer & Wulz, Lawn ;\fower Makers Shortcut Safety, 16 TRIAL 46, 48 (Nov. 
1980) (same). Strauss Tl, supra note 172 (source of the material in the second and third 
quotation). 
174. See CPSA Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection 
and Fin. of the House Comm. On Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
99 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 House CPSA Hearings] (statement of Peter Schuck). But see id. 
at 106 (statement of Stanley Groner); infra text accompanying note 198 (industry did 
cooperate). 
175. See S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 24 (statement of Peter Schuck). 
176. See Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L. J. 1, 62 
n.341 (1982); 1975 House CPSA Hearings, supra note 174, at 95 (statement of Peter Schuck); 
accord S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 24 (same). 
177. See 1975 House CPSA Hearings, supra note 174, at 88, 92. 
178. See S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 37, 43-47 (statement of Mark Silbergeld). 
179. See, e.g., supra notes 158-61, 166-69 and accompanying text. 
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ficiently the Commissioners and staff. 180 In interviews and Congressional 
hearings, the Executive Director of the OPE! and others did recite the 
litany of deficiencies in the OPPE study; 181 identify as important, CPSC 
failure to conduct necessary analyses before commencing, and to provide 
CU proper direction during, the proposed standard development process; 182 
charge that agency staff preferred to monitor passively standard devel-
opment; 183 and acknowledge that the time provided was inadequate. 184 
Moreover, several employees of producers were realistic about the con-
straints imposed on CU, 185 although a few of these representatives sug-
gested that the offeror be judged by the number of its recommendations 
which were included in the final Commission rule. 186 Nonetheless, the 
OPEI official and numerous representatives of manufacturing interests did 
criticize CU in many ways. The offeror was said to lack the requisite 
experience with lawn mowers, standard writing and product design187 as 
well as to have preconceptions and biases.188 Representatives of producers 
180. See 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 255 (statement of Dennis 
Db:) (relating to the first criticism); TI with Dennis Dix, OPEI Executive Director (May 16, 
1984) (same); Tis with industry representatives 1,2 (same); H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 
75, at 543 (statement of Dennis Dix) (relating to the second criticism); CPSC Reauthorization: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science 
and Transp., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 107, 137 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Senate Reauthorization 
Hearings] (statement of Dennis Dix) (same); 1981 Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra, 
at 107 (relating to the third criticism); Dix TI, supra (same); TI with industry representative 
3 (same). 
181. See 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 255-56 (statement of Dennis 
Dix); accord id. at 259 (statement of OPEI General Counsel Mac Dunaway); Tis with several 
additional industry representatives. 
182. 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 256-57 (statement of Dennis 
Dix); accord Dix TI, supra note 180; TI with industry representative 4; Tis with several 
additional industry representatives. 
183. See 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 255 (statement of Dennis 
Dix); Tis with several additional industry representatives. See generally supra note 180 
(citations to DLx statements for second proposition). 
184. See Dix TI, supra note 180; Implementation of the CPSA; Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (Oct. 1977) [hereinafter Oct. 1977 Senate Oversight Hearings] (statement 
of Philip Knox); TI with industry representative 5; Tis with several additional industry 
representatives. OPEi's Executive Director also testified that CPSC seemed "locked in" to 
a particular solution and that a "revolutionary concept of standard-development with much 
apparent promise ha[d] been persistently abused and undermined by the Commission in the 
most conspicuous manner." 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 256. See 
supra note 180 (citations to Dix statements for second proposition). 
185. See, e.g., TI with industry representative 3, supra note 180; TI with industry 
representative 4, supra note 182; TI with industry representative 6. 
186. See, e.g., TI with industry representative 1, supra note 180; TI with industry 
representative 7. 
187. See TI with industry representatives 1-3, supra note 181; TI with industry repre-
sentative 7, supra note 186; TI with industry representative 8. 
188. See TI with industry representative 4, supra note 182; TI with industry represent-
ative 7, supra note 186; TI with industry representative 9; Knox statement, supra note 184. 
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also criticized CU for failing to manage properly the project, establish 
priorities, treat the principal hazard, perform technical work, listen to 
industry, consider either operator behavior, consumer acceptance or needs, 
or test or verify the restrictions the offeror proposed.189 CU as well 
allegedly submitted suggestions which were too design-oriented190 and that 
might have impugned the integrity of the product.191 Industry's views were 
epitomized by several representatives' characterization of CU as a "pub-
lishing house, not a manufacturer of lawn mowers." 192 
Outside assessors have confirmed much that is said above. The Comp-
troller reported that the CPSC did not adequately inform CU about 
technical support that should have been included in its recommendations 
or monitor the offeror's progress, much less initiate corrective action 
during proposed standard development when it appeared that CU was 
proceeding improperly. 193 Professor Schwartz thought that CU had pre-
conceptions about potential solutions which were "too strong for the 
Commissioners," while she identified deficiencies in the proposed standard 
development process that the offeror might have remedied but rarely 
blamed CU for them. 194 The professor also found that CPSC's NOP 
"included almost all conceivable mower-related hazards," neither ranking 
them nor setting priorities, so that CU apparently was to treat each 
189. See, e.g., TI with industry representative 7, supra note 186 (relating to organization 
and management); TI with industry representative 8, supra note 187 (same); TI with industry 
representative 8, supra (relating to priority setting and identifying and treating principal 
hazard); TI with industry representative 7, supra (relating to technical work); TI with 
industry representative 9, supra note 188 (same); Dix TI, supra note 180 (relating listening 
to manufacturers); TI with industry representative 7, supra (same); A Mower Safety Code 
with Sharper Edge, Bus. WEEK 17 (Aug. 11, 1975) (statement of David McLaughlin, former 
President, Toro Co.) (same); Dix TI, supra (relating to consideration of operator behavior, 
consumer acceptance and needs); TI with industry representative 6, supra note (same); Tis 
with industry representatives 1, 3, supra (same); TI with industry representative 2, supra 
note 180 (relating to testing and verfying). 
190. Dix TI, supra note 180; TI with industry representative 1, supra note 180; TI with 
industry representative 9, supra note 188. See generally Schwartz, supra note 3, at 92-93. 
191. Dix TI, supra note 180; TI with industry representative l, supra note 180; TI with 
industry representative 8, supra note 187; TI with industry representative 9, supra note 188. 
Numerous other persons whom I interviewed concurred in a number of these criticisms. 
Moreover, nearly everyone whom I interviewed offered additional specific criticisms that 
were not mentioned by anyone else. 
192. Remarks to that effect were made by numerous industry representatives. 
193. GAO STUDY, supra note 32, at 9-10. The Comptroller General did not assess CU's 
work. 
194. See TI with Teresa Schwartz (May 2, 1984) (relating to preconceptions). Professor 
Schwartz found standard development complicated by the CPSA's requirements regarding 
extensive public participation, substantial evidence and performance standards. See Schwartz, 
supra note 3, at 95; cf. id. at 62-68, 73-95 (comprehensive analysis of complications she 
identified); id. at 79-95 (comprehensive analysis of CU's role). But cf. 1981 Senate Reau-
thorization Hearings, supra note 180, at 246 (statement of Lester Lave) (CPSC analysis 
"much better than anything in the past" and certainly "very helpful in arriving at the kind 
of standards they had"). 
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equally, and these difficulties came "home to roost in the evaluation 
phase." 195 Nonetheless, the analyst concluded that the time required for 
standard development did "not seem so unreasonable," because private 
standards writing organizations normally take several years to complete 
comparable projects. 196 Professor Hamilton testified that the CPSC con-
sidered CU's submission unsatisfactory, authorized additional costly stand-
ard development work, rewrote the standard tendered by the offeror and 
issued a proposal quite different from it197 but remarked that deficiencies 
were not attributable to inadequate procedures, as "there was extensive 
cooperation from producers [and] extensive inputs from all interested 
groups."19s 
Given the complications that attended this initiative, work performed 
by CU appears creditable. Moreover, the problems which did arise can be 
ascribed at least as much to CPSC inexperience, industry recalcitrance and 
the difficulties inherent in experimenting with complex, untested admin-
istrative procedures as to offeror deficiencies. 
Appraisals of the input provided by reimbursed individuals were mixed. 
A CPSC employee stated that disparities of perspective between funded 
members of the public and manufacturers made the proceeding "murder 
to live through" and that some citizens helped create an "abrasive at-
mosphere."199 The officer remarked that one technical person "was a very 
vocal, active consumer representative" and much that the individual wanted 
was included in the final agency rule.200 That official's views were shared 
by additional Commission staffers, 201 one of whom also thought that 
numerous citizens "contributed significantly," specifically identifying three 
others who were very diligent and offered valuable input.202 The Project 
Monitor for the CPSC observed that "overall public participation was 
helpful," that CU received "skilled nonindustry technical help," and that 
people possessing such expertise made important contributions and gen-
erally were more effective than lay consumers, who were a "little impres-
195. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 78, 89; cf. id. at 62-68, 77-95 (comprehensive 
analysis of CPSC's role). 
196. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 95. 
197. See 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 349, 351, 355 (statement of 
Professor Hamilton). 
198. See id. at 351. 
199. TI with CPSC employee 1. 
200. Id. 
201. One said he "played a very important role, was very hard working and tenacious 
and made sure his fairly reasonable points got across." TI with CPSC employee 2. 
202. TI with CPSC employee 3. The official thought the person above "worked tirelessly 
to insure consumers were afforded protections CU intended to provide;" that a second 
person "for little money did a hell of a lot of work," especially on thrown objects testing," 
and that a CPSC consultant's later research "would not have gotten far without his work;" 
that a third individual "built and maintained, a constituency for lawnmower standards [by) 
illustrating the human tragedy associated with blade contact;" and that a fourth citizen 
"provided an important balance to industry participants" when voting. Id. 
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sionable. " 203 The monitor added, however, that lay consumers were 
"extremely useful in warning and labeling issues," helping everyone ap-
preciate how users handle lawn mowers.204 Another CPSC officer believed 
that citizens "managed to be on a par with, and had as much influence 
as, industry. " 205 
The Project Director for CU said that individuals made helpful con-
tributions, imposing more safety requirements than manufacturers; that 
those who had "never used mowers" offered "some pretty good input,>! 
and that one technical person "worked tremendously and contributed 
substantially," but the CU employee found that some individuals stopped 
participating, were "leeches" or "had a financial interest. " 206 The Project 
Director's assistant stated that "consumer participation was quite good" 
and that certain recommendations made by citizens appeared in the pro-
posal that CU submitted to the CPSC while a few of the suggestions 
remained in the final rule. 207 The assistant acknowledged that there was 
some turnover among the funded individuals involved in proposed standard 
development but contended that it "was not a problem in terms of 
continuity.' ' 208 
Compensated parties who had technical expertise found that public 
involvement was effective and of high quality. One of these reimbursed 
people characterized funded participation as a "good use of taxpayer 
money that let the agency hear what the average person thought and 
provided alternative viewpoints backed up by the hard data on which 
CPSC decisions are based," thus helping it "do a better job."209 A second 
individual with technical skills claimed that "some of the really major 
inputs and most significant suggestions came from completely nontechnical 
people," whose adversarial questioning forced others to think. 210 He added 
that those persons with technical experience worked for much "less than 
their normal rates [and were] pretty well qualified academically but may 
have lacked practical background;" one of the individuals was "very 
vocal, understood the political process, and provided beneficial input" 
and two other technical people ''participated in testing that helped develop 
203. TI with CPSC employee 4. 
204. Cf. id. ("consumer sounding board" convened to address controversial CU rec-
ommendation on "dead man" controls less "useful than other consumer participation"). 
See generally Schwartz, supra note 3, at 86 n.391 and accompanying text (discussion of 
consumer sounding board). 
205. TI with CPSC employee 5. 
206. TI with Bertram Strauss (May 2, 1984). 
207. TI with George Papritz (Apr. 4, 1984). The CU official cited a consumer's 
"suggestion that lawnmowers not be activated when in reverse, [which] was included in 
CU's proposal and remained in the final standard." Id. 
208. Id. But see infra note 232 and accompanying text. 
209. TI with funded participant 1, supra note 166. Cf. id. (funding "very good use of 
taxpayer money"). 
210. TI with funded participant 3, supra note 169. 
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a stopping time based on human factors. " 211 A third person possessing 
technical expertise found that "public participation was helpful and mean-
ingful" and that some lay consumer "input was very valuable," citing as 
examples their contributions to development of product warnings and 
successful challenges to industry contentions that proposed requirements 
could not be met. 212 But the technical expert cautioned that these partici-
pants need help in understanding technical issues and with that assistance 
they "can be very effective and afford insights that engineers just do not 
have. " 213 Another citizen with technical training said that individuals had 
"significant impact but not uniformly" because of their inability to "spend 
the time necessary" or to "offer substantive counter-arguments," and the 
person recounted difficulties that he encountered in attempting to ''secure 
meaningful data with which to oppose industry contentions or help non-
technical participants," problems that led to "unjustifiable compromise 
on numerical limitations," omission of potential requirements and occa-
sional "shooting from the hip."214 Similarly, a reimbursed doctor asserted 
that technically-oriented consumers could not obtain necessary informa-
tion, so that they had "no way of verifying" essential technical data 
supplied by producers but had to "accept it on faith [or] go to extremes 
to find otherwise. " 215 The physician attributed these difficulties partly to 
resource disparities between full-time, salaried industry representatives and 
part-time, underpaid citizens.216 
Quite a few funded participants who did not have technical skills 
agreed with the last statement: and some of these persons concurred in 
numerous views of the technical consumers.217 One concern voiced by 
several lay participants was a feeling of inferiority vis-a-vis employees of 
manufacturers who had been involved actively in mower design for many 
years. 218 A reimbursed nontechnical individual did say that citizens were 
"very active, were listened to and won some issues."219 
Industry-oriented observers were less complimentary. One stated that 
a compensated engineer "made a very good contribution," especially in 
thrown objects testing, and that "his data were used in developing CU's 
standard. " 220 A second person employed by a producer expressed "high 
regard for technical public participants," indicating that they and manu-
211. Id. 
212. TI with funded participant 4, 'supra note 170. 
213. Id. 
214. TI with funded participant 2, supra note 168. 
215. Consumer Participation Meeting, supra note 35, at 91, reprinted in Regulatory 
Reform Hearings, supra note 66, at 35-36 (statement of Robert Goldstone). 
216. Id.; accord Consumer Participation Meeting, supra note 35, at 90. 
217. See, e.g.,·Consul}rer Participation Meeting, supra note 35, at 59, 135-37, 139. 
218. See id. at 97-98, 136. 
219. Id. at 117. 
220. TI with industry representative 3, supra note 180. 
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facturing representatives respected and understood each other,221 and thought 
that there were many "good ordinary consumers who spent time" edu-
cating themselves, who helped "technical people get a better perspective" 
by requiring explanations and who "did an excellent job" with editorial 
projects.222 Another industry employee found "great value in having prod-
uct users who could see the practical problems associated with the concepts 
being put forth" and exercised a "lot of common sense. " 223 
But some of these evaluators and numerous others involved in lawn 
mower manufacturing contended that few of the citizens were as neutral 
or as competent as they might have been. Those consumers who claimed 
to possess technical proficiency were said to be promoting their economic 
self-interest either as potential expert witnesses in products liability 
litigation224 or as developers of potential solutions to mower hazards225 or 
to have limited understanding of the product. 226 Some lay consumers 
allegedly were biased because they knew people injured in lawn mower 
accidents.227 Correspondingly, a number of nontechnical citizens were said 
to have contributed nothing,228 delayed progress by asking irrelevant ques-
tions or by seeking too many explanations, 229 attended meetings irregularly, 
or ceased participating when the work became too complex or the cost of 
involvement became too great, or they lost interest or believed that 
everything possible in terms of improved product safety had been accom-
plishe.d. 230 
Few extra-agency evaluators have assessed the contributions of reim-
bursed consumers. Professor Schwartz said that CU's bias made it "dif-
ficult to judge individuals' influence" and that resource discrepancies 
between the industry and citizens, who could not "hire consultants or 
221. TI with industry representative 4, supra note 182; Tis with several other industry 
representatives. 
222. TI with industry representative 4, supra note 182. 
223. TI with industry representative 2, supra note 180; accord Tis with other industry 
representatives. Many thought that neutral, competent consumers could contribute to stand-
ard development but emphasized the difficulty of securing such persons. 
224. A number of technical public participants have testified as experts. 
225. I could identify only one technical participant who possibly had some interest by 
virtue of his appearance in Congressional hearings on behalf of a licensor of lawn mower 
safety devices. See S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 20. But so many industry represen-
tatives alluded to persons with such interests that there may well have been numerous others. 
See, e.g., Dix TI, supra note 180; TI with industry representative 3, supra note 180. 
226. See, e.g., TI with industry representative 2, supra note 180. University professors 
were particularly the object of criticism of this participant and several other industry 
representatives. 
227. See, e.g., TI with industry representative 8, supra note 187. 
228. See, e.g., TI with industry representative 1, supra note 180. Homemakers were 
especially the object of scorn of this participant and several other industry representatives. 
229. See, e.g., Dix TI, supra note 180; TI with industry representative 6, supra note 
185. 
230. See, e.g., Dix TI, supra note 180; TI with industry representative 4, supra note 
182; TI industry representative 6, supra note 185. 
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research and testing experts," meant that the consumers "had to accept'on 
faith' basic technical information that industry participants supplied. " 231 
Moreover, she found that the involvement of individuals lacked the con-
tinuity of producers and decreased over time, thus requiring recruitment 
of "new consumer participants [which was] "very inefficient. " 232 
The effectiveness and quality of compensated input subsequent to 
proposed standard development also were mixed.233 In the agency's 1977 
hearing, a lay consumer depended primarily on anecdotes and personal 
opinion to advocate product controls whose cost she could not say pur-
chasers would accept and which requirements were rejected in the CPSC's 
proposed and final regulations.234 The Commissioners asked the individual 
"few questions because [her] points" had "been before the Commission" 
for a considerable period of time.235 A funded engineer provided what can 
be characterized fairly as a "wandering monologue," which the CPSC 
afforded little treatment in its proposal.236 Another individual who pos-
sessed technical expertise criticized the agency's decision to delete from 
the Commission's proposal injury-reducing requirements, included in CU's 
submission and for which technology was available, while the technical 
witness identified certain deficiencies in testing conducted by the Com-
mission's consultant.237 In the 1978 agency meeting, the person argued 
that brake clutches would improve safety substantially and that the mech-
anisms were available theoretically and could be applied practically to 
mowers, using testing he had performed to challenge industry contentions 
regarding reliability.238 And, in 1979, the CPSC specifically relied on the 
witness' opinion in finding that the brake clutch device was safe and 
reliable.239 
3. Matchbooks 
In October, 1974, the American Society for Testing and Materials 
(ASTM), a nonprofit corporation which develops "standards on charac-
teristics and performance of materials, products, systems, and services," 
231. See Schwartz TI, supra note 194 (material in the first quotation); Schwartz, supra 
note 3, at 82 n.356 (material in the remainder). See generally supra notes 215-16 and 
accompanying text. 
232. Schwartz TI, supra note 194; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 82. But cf. supra text 
accompanying note 208 (consumer turnover not a problem in terms of continuity). See 
generally OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-31 (discussion of turnover). 
233. See Transcript in re Oral Presentation of Data, Views, and Arguments on Proposed 
Standards for Power Lawn Mowers, Washington, D.C. (June 13, 1977) [hereinafter 1977 
Transcript]; Transcript of Public Meeting on Power Lawn Mower Brake/Clutch Reliability, 
Bethesda, Md. (Dec. 12, 1978) [hereinafter 1978 Transcript]. 
234. See 1977 Transcript, supra note 233, at 121-29. 
235. See id. at 129 (statement of Comm'r Kushner). 
236. See id. at 237-57. 
237. See id. at 132-57. 
238. See 1978 Transcript, supra note 233, at 63-79. 
239. See 44 Fed. Reg. 9989, 10,012 (1979). 
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was selected by the CPSC to write requirements associated with match-
books. 240 The ASTM sought help from the National Consumer's League 
(NCL) in facilitating public involvement and agreed to pay for expenses 
incurred by citizens.241 The NCL assembled a "consumer caucus" which 
had expert consultants, and it produced a position paper that served as 
the starting point for much of the proposed standard development effort. 242 
On the twelve days that ASTM held meetings, fifteen consumers, who 
constituted more than half of the offeror's working group, caucused 
separately to analyze technical issues and to ascertain areas of agreement 
and compromise among themselves and others involved in proposed stand-
ard development.243 ASTM's proposal which was drafted by consensus, 
included numerous ideas suggested by the consumer caucus and was 
tendered on time in February, 1975.244 The staff of the CPSC rejected 
and modified some of the offeror's recommendations245 and the Commis-
240. See Regulations Governing ASTM Committees: Society Scope (Sept. 1973), re-
printed in Note, supra note 27, at 1179 n.38 (discussion of ASTM's description); 40 Fed. 
Reg. 1298, 1298-99 (1975) (relating to ASTM's selection); cf. Hearings on Dep't of Housing 
and Urban Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropriations for 1976 Before the Subcomm. on HUD-
Indep. Agencies of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, 905 
(1975) [hereinafter 1976 Senate Appropriations Hearings] (only other offer "received from 
Computerized Biomechanical Analysis, Inc., a research laboratory"). See OPPE REPORT, 
supra note 31, at D-20 (only comprehensive offer from ASTM, and it was selected to be 
the offeror); id. at D-20, D-21 & D-21-27 (discussion of the proceeding's background, the 
structure of ASTM's working organization and the proceeding's development phase); cf. 39 
Fed. Reg. 32,050, 32,051-52 (1974) (NOP). See Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1338-39, 1338-
45, 1412-16 (helpful discussion of ASTM, similar voluntary standards writing organizations, 
the work of ASTM and other such organizations as offerors and the role of nongovernmental 
standards in the development of mandatory federal health and safety standards). 
241. See Note, supra note 27, at 1193 n.123 & 1208 n.193; 1977 House Oversight 
Hearings, supra note 34, at 260 (statement of David Swankin); cf. Note, supra note 27, at 
1208 n.193 (although some consumer participants "were not compensated and others received 
only travel expenses, several were paid fees," as were a few ASTM technical experts); infra 
note 396 (description of NCL, which was offeror in the miniature Christmas tree lights 
proceeding). Ironically, ASTM and NCL were unsuccessful offeror applicants in architectural 
glazing. See Hamilton supra note 35, at 1413 n.282. And had NCL been successful, it would 
have selected ASTM "to manage and house the project." Note, supra note 27, at 1179. Cf. 
S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 91-92; The Consumer Product Testing Act: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Commerce Comm. on S.643, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. 89-90 (1975) [hereinafter S.643 Hearings] (statement of David Swankin) (discussion, 
not provided in text below, by NCL's project director of NCL's participation). 
242. See S.643 Hearings, supra note 241, at 89; S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 91-
92; cf. Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1416 (more than majority of ASTM committee was 
consumers). 
243. See Note, supra note 27, at 1193 n.123; S.643 Hearings, supra note 241, at 88-89 
(statement of David Swankin); S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 92 (same); Hamilton, 
supra note 35, at 1416. 
244. See S.643 Hearings, supra note 241, at 89 (statement of David Swankin); S.644 
Hearings, supra note 77, at 92 (same); cf. 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, 
at 352-53 (statement of Professor Hamilton) (discussion of "consensus process"). 
245. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-22; cf. 1977 House Oversight Hearings, 
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sioners were quite critical of the material submitted, even requesting that 
the ASTM supplement its work by preparing a narrative technical ra-
tionale. 246 Nonetheless, in April, 1976, the CPSC promulgated a proposed 
regulation that incorporated most of the offeror's suggestions,247 while 
several stringent provisions included in that proposal by the Commissioners 
and recommended by ASTM were omitted from the May, 1977, final 
rule, 248 so that it resembled a preexisting voluntary standard issued by the 
ASTM. 249 These machinations suggest that the need for mandatory controls 
might have been debatable.250 The agency regulation may have lacked 
substantiation and major provisions of the rule were invalidated because 
they were not supported by substantial evidence.251 
supra note 34, at 353 (statement of Professor Hamilton) (ASTM's submission stringent, 
including controversial burn time requirement industry opposed). See OPPE REPORT, supra 
note 31, at D-26-27 (comprehensive list of staff criticisms, including deficiencies as to 
supporting justification, testing and risk to children); accord 1977 House Oversight Hearings, 
supra at 331 (statement of Allan Saeks). But cf. OPPE REPORT, supra at D-24 (ASTM 
submission directly addressed all NOP hazards except risks to children which ASTM claimed 
were addressed indirectly); S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 125 (statement of William 
Cavanaugh) (ASTM submitted complete record and documentation). 
246. See infra notes 255, 257 and accompanying text; 41 Fed. Reg. 14,112, 14,117-20 
(1976) (modification of ASTM submission in CPSC proposed rule). But cf. infra text 
accompanying note 247 (proposal incorporated most ASTM recommendations). 
247. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-22; 41 Fed. Reg. 14,113, 14,114-15 (1976). 
CPSC's proposal "adopted most of the ASTM proposed standard but added novel and 
complex provisions relating to child-proof covers." Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1414. 
248. See 42 Fed. Reg. 22,656, 22,660-65 (1977). The most notable omission the Com-
missioners included was the proposal on child-proof covers. See id. at 22,660; Authorizations 
and Other Amendments to the CPSA: Hearings on H.R. 10,819 Before the Subcomm. on 
Consumer Protection and Fin. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1978) [hereinafter H.R. 10,819 Hearings] (statement of Comm'r 
Franklin). The most notable omission ASTM recommended was that the burn time proposal 
be deleted because of CPSC questions about technical feasibility and manufacturer ability 
to satisfy it and industry opposition. See 42 Fed. Reg. 22,656, 22,660-61 (1977); Harter, 
supra note 176, at 95 n.526; 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 353 (statement 
of Professor Hamilton); Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1414 n.286, 1416; cf. id. at 1414 
(CPSC proposal received many adverse comments). See generally Harter, supra at 94-95. 
249. See Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1414; 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 
34, at 353-354 (statement of Professor Hamilton); TI with CPSC employee 1; cf. infra note 
251 and accompanying text (resemblance may have been even closer after standard's major 
provisions were judicially invalidated). 
250. This was true of other products chosen for regulation. See, e.g., infra notes 319, 
362-63 and accompanying text. 
251. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text (relating to substantiation); 1977 
House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 354 (colloquy between Rep. Eckhardt and 
Professor Hamilton) (same); H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 58 (statement of 
Rep. Eckhardt) (same); accord Tis with several CPSC employees; see also D.D. Bean and 
Sons Co. v. CPSC, 574 F.2d 643, 650-51 (1st Cir. 1978) (relating to invalidation). In D.D. 
Bean, the First Circuit invalidated the performance requirements but sustained the general 
or design requirements. CPSC subsequently deleted the standard's invalidated portions and 
proceeded with enforcement mechanisms. See Hearings on Dep't of Housing and Urban 
Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropriations for 1980 Before the Subcomm. on HUD-Indep. 
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Appraisals by the CPSC of the ASTM were positive and realistic. One 
Commissioner testified that a "totally unexpected, useful and novel ap-
proach was stimulated by the offeror.' ' 252 A Chairman said that ASTM 
developed a "pretty good standard," given the constraints.253 The Chair-
man admitted, however, that the CPSC "did a disservice to" ASTM by 
requiring compliance with the ninety-day limitation to test the law254 and 
that the offeror may have failed to address adequately child-resistant 
packaging, despite pursuing an approach that was "completely consistent" 
with resolution of the issue.255 Although another Commissioner acknowl-
edged that the ASTM's submission was "innovative" and "suffered from 
the extreme haste of [meeting] the statutory deadline, " 256 he said that the 
CPSC consumed 524 days essentially putting it ''in a form that made 
sense, had a technical rationale, and could be defended in court. " 257 
One agency staffer thought that ASTM tendered a product which the 
offeror believed was responsive to CPSC instructions, but the submission 
evoked "such stiff industry opposition" that much of it was rejected and 
unfairly discredited.258 A second Commission employee found that ''ASTM 
had a lot of technical competence" and that the offeror "did a good job" 
of assembling an "extremely good group of consumers" in a way that 
afforded them focus and organization, thus enhancing their efficacy, as 
well as of completing so expeditiously a "task of that size, considering 
the obstacles" created principally by agency monitors who provided in-
sufficient ground work, afforded little guidance, and even refused to 
answer questions.259 Similarly, the Report prepared by the OPPE observed 
that the ASTM's submission addressed all hazards in the agency NOP 
except risk to children, which was treated indirectly and that ASTM's 
proposal included deficiencies, most of which were attributable to inade-
Agencies of the House Appropriations Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 417-18 (1979) 
[hereinafter 1980 House Appropriations Hearings] (statement of CPSC General Counsel 
Andrew Krulwich); 42 Fed. Reg. 53,709 (1977) (same); cf. Tis with several CPSC employees 
(remaining requirements are virtually worthless and cost alone prevented repeal). See generally 
infra note 328. 
252. See H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 58 (statement of Comm'r Franklin). 
253. Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 66, at 34; 1977 House Oversight Hearings, 
supra note 34, at 251. 
254. See Hearings on Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropria-
tions for 1976 Before the Subcomm. on HUD-Jndep. Agencies of the House Appropriations 
Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, 372 (1975) [hereinafter 1976 House Appropriations 
Hearings]. 
255. See S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 249-50, 252-53. 
256. See 1978 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 159, at 118; 1977 House 
Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 251 (statements of Comm'r Pittle). 
257. See supra, note 256 (two sources cited). 
258. TI with CPSC employee 2. The official explained that the Commissioners, especially 
Chairman Simpson, initially desired stringent controls and that ASTM "listened carefully" 
producing requirements that it believed were responsive. Id. 
259. Tl with CPSC employee 3. 
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quate CPSC monitoring.260 Although Commission staff responsible for 
analyzing the material tendered by the ASTM recommended many 
changes,261 a number of these suggested alterations were rejected in the 
final rule which incorporated numerous ideas provided by the offeror. 262 
Two industry representatives found that the ASTM "did an excellent 
job" in preparing the standard, in meeting the needs of the CPSC, in 
managing the project-especially the committee system263-and in persuad-
ing the Justice Department to relent on a longstanding antitrust consent 
decree, which enabled producers to discuss technology and conduct round 
robin testing.264 A third person affiliated with manufacturing believed that 
lifting the decree was all ASTM had achieved,265 while a fourth such 
individual thought the offeror's work was "not very professional."266 
Although few aligned with industry mentioned the CPSC, a fifth repre-
sentative of producers found that agency staff were good, fair and available 
when needed.267 
The Managing Director of ASTM testified that the offeror's submission 
would have reduced significantly matchbook hazards and that ASTM 
provided the Commission with complete supporting documentation and a 
comprehensive record.268 The offeror's Managing Director admitted, how-
ever, that ASTM tendered the standard aft-er attaining an "achievable 
threshold," while indicating areas for future work269 and that time con-
straints could have caused "management and technical errors," did create 
"bad group dynamics," and made proposed standard development very 
expensive.270 He also suggested that the CPSC afford offerors more guid-
ance, especially initial hazard analysis, and praised agency staff for "out-
standing cooperation. " 271 The person responsible for managing the 
contributions made by the NCL thought that some offeror "work was 
260. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-5, 3-8, 3-9; cf. id. at 3-5; Schwartz, supra 
note 3, at 65 n.232 and accompanying text (for three hazards in NOP, CPSC "had so little 
injury evidence" as to make their existence questionable). 
261. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
262. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text. 
263. Tis with industry representatives 1,2. 
264. See Tl with industry representative 1, supra note 263. 
265. See TI with industry representative 3. 
266. See Tl with industry representative 4. 
267. TI with industry representative 5. 
268. See S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 121 (statement of William Cavanaugh) 
(appearance of first claim); id. at 125 (appearance of second claim). 
269. See id. at 121; accord OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-22; 1976 House 
Appropriations Hearings, supra note 254, at 372 (statement of Chairman Simpson). But 
ASTM also asked CPSC to "publish the submitted standard as an interim measure," 
suggesting many areas for fruitful research. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-22; 
accord S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 121; 1976 House Appropriations Hearings, supra 
at 372 (statement of Chairman Simpson). 
270. See S.643 Hearings, supra note 241, at 115; S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 
121-22 (statements of William Cavanaugh). 
271. See S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 122-23. 
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very good" and that other work, "ASTM's science and economics," for 
instance, was not. 272 But the manager found that "overall it did a good 
job" given this industry's peculiarities, ASTM's inexperience in writing 
technical rationales to support standards and agency staff's "silent mon-
itoring."273 
Citizens' assessment of the offeror generally were complimentary. Two 
individuals believed that ASTM "did a good job," tendering "quite thor-
ough" requirements, 274 "creating and organizing procedures" and "balanc-
ing industry and consumers. " 275 But two other citizen participants found 
the atmosphere more antagonistic than adversarial, 276 and a fifth person 
said that manufacturers often "held back economic data. "Z77 
Outside evaluations of the ASTM differed. Professor Hamilton found 
that the possibility of industry vetoing requirements developed in the manner 
that these were did not materialize278 and ascribed ASTM's timely completion 
of proposed standard development to the "reservoir of technical knowledge 
and skill in its membership. "Z79 Professor Schwartz stated that the CPSC 
"substantially revised" the offeror's suggestions, partly because of agency 
mistakes,280 while the Comptroller General said that "statutory time frames" 
precluded ASTM completion of "certain desirable technical work. " 281 
It is important to remember that the ASTM operated under severe 
constraints.282 The temporal restriction and the difficulty of quickly drafting 
a proposed standard were significant complications. 283 The CPSC first failed 
to specify all risks and to provide adequate hazard data, so that the offeror 
272. See TI with David Swankin [hereinafter Swankin TI I]. 
273. See TI with David Swankin [hereinafter Swankin TI II]. ASTM's submission "was 
done like a voluntary standards organization and so lacked a rationale" and CPSC employees 
"sat back during standard development," later criticizing the submission. Id.; cf. infra notes 
289-292 and accompanying text (industry's peculiarities). 
274. See Tis with funded participants 1, 2. 
275. See id. 
276. See Tis with funded participants 3, 4. 
277. See TI with funded participant 5. 
278. See Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1416. 
279. Id. 
280. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 88. 
281. See GAO STUDY, supra note 32, at 41. 
282. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 94 (first four offeror proceedings begun within five 
month period, so CPSC "did not learn of its mistakes in one project in time to avoid them 
in another"). 
283. See supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text. ASTM completed the project in 92 
days. See Apr. 1977 Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 78, at 28 (statement of William 
Cavanaugh); cf. S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 121 (same); 1978 House Appropriations 
Hearings, supra note 159, at 118 (statement of Comm'r Pittle) (timely completion due to 
ASTM's wish to ascertain whether its procedures were adequately responsive). In fairness, 
timely completion may well have compromised the quality of ASTM's submission. 
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"had to initiate and develop its own risk analysis. " 284 As to some hazards 
the Commission identified, there were minimal supporting data; indeed, for 
three hazards there was "so little evidence of injury as to make" their 
existence questionable. 285 Other hazards could not be treated rapidly or 
remedied cheaply. 286 Deficient agency guidance also hindered expeditious 
development of the proposed standard. 287 Moreover, conflicts between con-
sumers and manufacturers created difficulty.288 Furthermore, the peculiarities 
of the industry created complications. The industry consisted of one major 
company, and this factor "severely limited" the availability of data.289 The 
manufacturers also lacked "analytical expertise and testing facilities" which 
the ASTM needed because it "had no competence in matchbook technol-
ogy. "290 The industry as well was under a consent decree that complicated 
data gathering and communications291 and was producing a commodity 
which was not amenable to economical standardization.292 In short, given 
the constraints, especially as to time, the ASTM performed competently, 
completing proposed standard development more expeditiously than other 
offerors. 293 
Citizen involvement received mixed reviews, particularly from agency 
employees. One staffer found the caucus was an "extremely good group 
[with] focus and organization which contributed a great deal" and helped 
individuals be more effective than in other proceedings.294 The evaluator 
observed that each citizen worked very hard, although the effort expended 
was not necessarily "seen in the final product," while the assessor stated 
that some consumers were excellent arbitrators, such as a public relations 
specialist who "could get agreement between conflicting groups" and a 
retired engineer who insured that "technical work approached reality."295 
A second Commission employee thought that many individuals "could not 
understand their suggestions' economic implications" or appreciate the 
284. S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 122 (statement of William Cavanaugh); accord, 
OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-13; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 65 n.233. 
285. See supra, note 260. 
286. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 64-65; infra note 292 and accompanying text. 
287. Many have recognized that CPSC assumed a hands off approach. See, e.g., H.R. 
10819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 58 (statement of Comm'r Franklin); S.644 Hearings, supra 
note 77, at 123 (statement of William Cavanaugh); supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
But cf. S.644 Hearings, at 122-23 (CPSC staff praised for cooperation). 
288. See, e.g., TI with industry representative 3, supra note 265; supra notes 276-77 and 
accompanying text. 
289. Swankin TI I, supra note 272 ("If you took out Diamond Match Company, the 
industry was comprised of small companies that did not even have economic divisions"). 
290. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 4-11; S.643 Hearings, supra note 241, at 116 
(statement of William Cavanaugh); cf. OPPE REPORT, supra, at 4-13, 6-6 (industry's technically 
unsophisticated nature partly responsible for inadequate ASTM technical support). 
291. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
292. See Swankin TI I, supra note 272. 
293. See supra note 283. 
294. TI with CPSC employee 3, supra note 259. 
295. Id. 
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"finer technical points" involved in potential regulation of matchbooks, 
although these were "not very complex."296 A third staffer said that "caucus 
members did a lousy job" because they demanded increased stringency in 
terms of proposed controls without supplying support for more rigorous 
requirements. 297 
The Project Manager for the ASTM found citizen activity "quite 
significant," emphasizing that consumers had much "experience, made 
matchbook injuries more real" and required ASTM and industry to propose 
a more stringent standard than they would have. 298 The Project Manager 
also described as "exactly the kind of input we wanted" one party's 
"statewide survey of fire marshals;" the contribution provided a "tremen-
dous amount of information" that would otherwise have cost "thousands 
of dollars and many hours of time. " 299 But he did admit that individuals 
were more helpful in pointing out, rather than solving, technical problems.300 
The Managing Director for the ASTM described consumers as "very 
heroic people," who "quickly learned" matchbook technology.301 The NCL's 
manager said that public involvement was "pretty good and better than 
any" which had occurred previously at the CPSC, 302 and that citizens used 
critical questioning techniques characteristic of good investigative report-
ing. 303 Moreover, this evaluator asserted that the consumer caucus document, 
which was prepared "after seven weeks of discussion and study and before 
any" effort was undertaken to draft a proposed standard, served as the 
point of departure for much subsequent work, requiring industry for the 
first time to justify why it could not comply with consumer requests, 304 as 
well as the source of much which the CPSC "finally adopted in its 
regulation."305 
One extra-agency assessor found that most caucus members were not 
"technically knowledgeable" and that those who were more well versed in 
296. TI with CPSC employee 4. 
297. TI with CPSC employee 5. The individual recited the oft-told story in the text 
accompanying note 316, infra. 
298. TI with Bernard Corrigan. Examples he cited were the message and burn-time 
requirements. CPSC staff found that the former would "have severe economic effects and 
provide little benefit" and the Commissioners "excluded them from the proposed standards." 
OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-26. 
299. OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-26. 
300. Id. 
301. See S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 122-23, 125; S.643 Hearings, supra note 241, 
at 115 (statements of William Cavanaugh). 
302. Swankin TI I, supra note 272. 
303. Id. 
304. See id.; S.643 Hearings, supra note 241, at 89 (statement of David Swankin). For 
example, "technical backup" enabled consumers to evaluate independently manufacturers' 
contention that "certain chemicals would create a serious toxicity problem." S.643 Hearings, 
at 90. 
305. See S.644 HeaHngs, supra note 77, at 92; Swankin TI I, supra note 273; cf. S.643 
Hearings, supra note 241, at 88-90; S.644 Hearings, supra at 91-92, 95-96 (additional discussion 
by Swankin of consumer involvement). 
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the technical aspects of matchbook regulation, or were more forceful, could 
have dominated the remainder.306 The individual also contended that citizens 
were responsible for a controversial requirement included in the ASTM's 
submission that ultimately was rejected by the CPSC.307 Another outside 
evaluator considered the caucus position paper "very worthwhile [and] a 
good precedent for consumer participation in standard-making. " 308 
Many industry observers were less positive. Several found that citizens, 
while well-intentioned, knew little about the product or its manufacture and 
lacked appreciation for the difficulty of complying with restrictions that 
they voted to impose. 309 Some of these analysts and others thought that 
consumers were too partial, premising their decisions on emotions or ide-
alism, 310 and that the caucus encouraged "bloc voting," which did not 
always reflect the technical merits of the questions at issue.311 
Funded citizens were "much more satisfied with their performance and 
influence than" those reimbursed participants who were involved in the 
architectural glazing proceeding.312 Many of the individuals believed that 
consumers were very effective, claiming that they "dragged industry into 
the twentieth century"313 and ultimately had more impact than manufactur-
ers.314 But these observers and others acknowledged that citizens sometimes 
agreed to propositions which were not premised on adequate technical 
data. 315 Indeed, the matchbook initiative may be epitomized by the oft-
recounted story of voting on "burn-times of eight, twelve, fifteen and 
twenty seconds," when there had been no "showing of impact of burn time 
variances on reduction of injuries. " 316 
4. Swimming Pool Slides 
In January, 1975, the CPSC selected the National Swimming Pool 
Institute (NSPI) to draft a standard governing swimming pool slides.317 The 
306. See Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1416. 
307. See id. at 1414, 1416. He was speaking of the burn time requirement. 
308. The outside assessor was Arnold Elkind, chair of the NCPS. See S.644 Hearings, 
supra note 77, at 92. It is important to remember the constraints under which consumers 
labored. See, e.g., id. at 122-23; S.643 Hearings, supra note 241, at 115 (statements of William 
Cavanaugh). 
309. See, e.g., Tis with industry representatives ·1, 2, supra note 263; Tl with industry 
representative 6. 
310. See, e.g., Tis with industry representatives 4, 5, supra notes 266-67. 
311. See, e.g., Tis with industry representatives 1, 2, supra note 263; TI with industry 
representative 3, supra note 265. 
312. Note, supra note 27, at 1209 text accompanying n.199. This observation seems 
premised primarily upon the fact that consumers worked much less "in concert" in the glass, 
than in the matchbook, proceeding. See id. at 1199, 1209 n.199. 
313. Consumer Participation Meeting, supra note 35, at 104. 
314. See, e.g., id. at 104-05, 115, 117. 
315. See, e.g., id. at 84. · 
316. See Memorandum to Commissioners, "A Constructive Criticism of§ 7 Proceedings," 
at 5, from funded participant 6. 
317. See 40 Fed. Reg. 3311, (1975). 
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Institute was the unanimous choice of neither the agency staff nor the 
Commissioners318 and there apparently was marginal need for regulation, 
given limited use of the product and the injuries attributable to it. 319 The 
proceeding was initiated by NSPI, a trade association of "1750 firms 
representing builders, manufacturers, and suppliers, architects, engineers, 
public officials and others allied with the swimming pool" industry and by 
Aqua Slide and Dive (Aqua), which as the producer of ninety-five percent 
of slides "had a substantial interest."320 Several consumers helped develop 
the package that the NSPI proferred to the CPSC in May.321 The agency 
staff were concerned about, and were instructed to revise, certain aspects 
of the submission.322 Moreover, the Commissioners hired a consultant to 
supply economic data which were believed necessary.323 In September, the 
CPSC published a proposal that changed the NSPI's installation require-
ments to recommendations because of jurisdictional concerns.324 That alter-
ation prompted the Project Manager for NSPI to question seriously the 
effort's value in reducing injuries.325 A final rule, similar to the Institute's 
submission, was issued by the Commission in January, 1976.326 Many 
318. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-12. CPSC rejected two prior NSPI offers 
because the offers were "inadequately responsive" to CPSC offeror regulations and NSPI 
relied too substantially on extant engineering data, made insufficient provision for public 
involvement, and requested too large a contribution from CPSC for administrative costs. Id. 
See 39 Fed. Reg. 37,804, 37,804 (1974); cf. 1976 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 
240, at 905 (Nova University only other applicant). 
319. See GAO STUDY, supra note 32, at 23-24; Hearings on Dep't of Housing and Urban 
Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropriations for 1977 Before the Subcomm. on HUD-Indep. 
Agencies of the House Appropriations Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 13 [hereinafter 
1977 House Appropriations Hearings] (statement of CPSC Chairman Simpson) (1976); Hearings 
on Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropriations for 1977 Before the 
Subcomm. on HUD-Indep. Agencies of the Senate.Appropriations Comm., 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess., pt. 3, 13 [hereinafter 1977 Senate Appropriations Hearings] (statement of Linda Hudek) 
(1976). But cf. id.; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 50-51 n.125-26 and accompanying text (Com-
missioners believed CPSA mandated.proceeding's initiation). See Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. 
v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 835-38 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussion of the proceeding's background); 
OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-10 to D-19 (same); 40 Fed. Reg. 42,562, 42,562-63 (1975) 
(same). 
320. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-12 (NSPI's description); Aqua Slide 'N' 
Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 835-36 (5th Cir. 1978) (proceeding's initiation and Aqua's 
description). 
321. See Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp., 569 F.2d at 836 (descriptions of the committee's 
composition and the structure of its working organization); OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 
D-12 to D-14 (same); OPPE REPORT, supra at D-15, D-16 Oist of NSPI's "achievements" and 
a summary of its recommendations by hazard area). 
322. See infra notes 329, 332 and accompanying text. But cf. infra notes 326, 332-33 and 
accompanying text (NSPI submission responsive to NOP and CPSC staff modified little and 
final rule included most recommendations). 
323. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-15-16. 
324. See 40 Fed. Reg. 42,562, 42,572 (1975). See generally OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, 
at 3-9 to 3-10; D-18 to D-19. 
325. OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-10. 
326. See 41 Fed. Reg. 2742, (1975). "The final standard ... was essentially the same as 
the proposed standard." OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 6-1. 
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familiar with the pool slides initiative find this the "least productive agency 
proceeding:"327 it was long and diverted scarce CPSC resources while the 
standard may have lacked technical substantiation and was partially over-
turned in court.328 
Analyses of the NSPI's work were checkered. A Commissioner said 
that the offeror's proposal resembled a voluntary standard that previously 
had been rejected, thus necessitating significant revision.329 Moreover, a 
consultant did have to be retained. One staffer for the CPSC was "not 
vezy impressed" with the technical competence displayed by NSPI.330 A 
second agency employee found that the proposed standard development 
effort was run poorly-especially in terms of the choice of citizens-and 
was dominated by industry, yielding requirements favorable to Aqua Slide 
and Dive.331 
Those Commission staffers who reviewed NSPI's submission "raised 
serious doubts concerning" the technical validity and the enforcement 
potential of the proposal but said that it responded to the NOP, addressed 
indicated hazards and defects in voluntary standards, and included a tech-
nical rationale and necessary economic data.332 Moreover, these evaluators 
minimally altered the offeror's document.333 
An agency doctor thought that the NSPI "did as well as possible," 
given the difficulties inherent in quickly identifying and solving the problem 
and recent creation of the CPSC and the offeror procedure.334 Another 
Commission employee believed that NSPI did an "extremely good job" of 
"managing the process" and of assembling qualified consumers and that 
327. Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 66, at 7; 1977 Senate Appropriations 
Hearings, supra note 319 at 12 (statements of Chairman Simpson). Many others have agreed. 
See, e.g., 1977 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra, at 67-68 (statement of Senator Prox-
mire); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 50-52. 
328. The petition was submitted in May, 1973, and the final standard was issued in 
January, 1976. OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-10, D-17. CPSC paid NSPI only $14,000 
to develop the standard. See id. at 4-30. But Aqua Slide 'N' Dive may have contributed as 
much as $300,000. See id. Moreover, standard development "consumed untold Commission 
resources." Schwartz, supra note 3, at 50. See Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 
831, 842-44 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing lack of substantiation and partial overturning); cf. 43 
Fed. Reg. 58,813, 58,813 (1978) (rescission of provisions court overturned). For subsequent 
history of pool slide regulation, see Schwartz, supra note 3, at 51 n.130 and accompanying 
text; 9 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 491, 529-30 (1981); CPSC Reauthorization: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 76, 121-22 (1985). 
329. See Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 66, at 34; 1977 House Oversight 
Hearings, supra note 34, at 251 (statements of Comm'r Pittle). See generally Dissenting 
Opinion of Comm'r Pittle (Dec., 1975) (Commissioner's initial opposition to commencing 
offeror proceeding). 
330. TI with CPSC employee I. 
331. TI with CPSC employee 2. 
332. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-17. 
333. See id; accord notes 324-26 and accompanying text. 
334. TI with CPSC employee 3. 
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its engineering consultant avoided numerous pitfalls encountered in other 
offeror proceedings.335 The OPPE study echoed much of the complimentary 
commentary, particularly regarding project administration by the NSPI and 
its consultant's input.336 
The consultant's manager found that there was little nonproductive 
antagonism between industry representatives and citizens, that the process 
was "professional, wide open" and responsive to consumers, and that the 
committee's small size and careful selection facilitated "smooth, efficient 
development. " 337 A committee member associated with manufacturing con-
curred, adding that "everything was done right, no time pressure existed, 
information from everywhere" was gathered and the manager "rebuked 
participants when they swayed to industry.' '338 The Deputy Chairman of 
the Human Factors and Behavioral Department of the Naval Research 
Institute, who served as a staffer on the committee, said that the committee 
"pretty unanimously" believed that the standard was "fair" and was the 
"best" attainable from available data while he found that NSPI was "very 
well organized."339 A citizen stated that the Project Director for the NSPI 
was "very valuable,'' explaining data so that all involved understood the 
information, and that the offeror's leadership and the committee's "struc-
ture, membership selection and size" enabled consumers to be effective. 340 
Extra-agency evaluations were mixed. Senator Proxmire found NSPI's 
solution so obvious that any school child could have duplicated it in an 
hour. 341 Professor Schwartz, in denominating this initiative the "pool slide 
fiasco,'' 342 apparently considered it one of the least successful proceedings.343 
But the ACUS consultant added that swimming pool slides often are cited 
"as an example of Commission failure,''344 which seems to be her principal 
focus of concern. 
Many observers of the initiative find that the CPSC was responsible 
for much perceived inadequacy in NSPI's work. Because the agency supplied 
insufficient injury data, the NSPI had to undertake additional testing but 
could not determine the precise cause of human injuries, so that its sub-
mission included requirements "supported by technical judgments instead 
of injury or laboratory data. " 345 Several Commissioners admitted that the 
335. TI with CPSC employee 4. 
336. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-15 to 17. 
337. TI with Robert Weiner. 
338. TI with industry representative 1. 
339. TI with T.E. Berghage. 
340. TI with funded participant 1. 
341. See 1977 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 319, at 67-68. 
342. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 49. 
343. See id. at 49-52. 
344. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 51. 
345. GAO STUDY, supra note 32, at 11, 24. This necessitated an additional CPSC study. 
Id. at 11. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 65 (CPSC required NSPI to treat a "number of 
hazards for which it had insufficient data on how product-related injuries had occurred"). 
But cf. GAO STUDY, supra at 42 (CPSC supplied NSPI some accident reports and intended 
that NSPI determine causality by applying its expertise). 
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CPSC may have defined the project too broadly and might have provided 
inadequate guidance. 346 Moreover, the Commissioners allegedly made last-
minute changes in the final regulation and deleted requirements agreed on 
by the NSPI and agency staff without notifying the Institute.347 NSPI also 
was hampered because it was working at the edge of state-of-the-art348 and 
with an industry dominated by one producer.349 Furthermore, the rule 
adopted by the Commission did include most of the offeror's recommen-
dations.350 In short, the NSPI performed rather well, given the constraints. 
The CPSC has praised the work of citizens. A Chairman made com-
plimentary comments about public activity, describing the proceeding as a 
"conscientious effort. " 351 One employee found that the consumers were an 
"extremely good group, some of whom were specialized or had long 
experience running pools," and that a few were "quite articulate about" 
slide hazards.352 A physician said that citizens were less helpful in providing 
technical input than in securing "consumer reaction to options," in esti-
mating consumer acceptability or in expediting the process. 353 A third staffer 
believed that public "participation was very good," because all coopera-
ted, 354 but a fourth employee thought that those "selected had no particular 
advocacy skills or ideas to contribute and were swamped. " 355 
The manager for NSPI's consultant was enthusiastic about consumer 
input, mentioning a pool owner "who asked the right questions" and 
346. See H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 58, 66 (statements of Comm'r Franklin, 
Chairman Byington); accord Schwartz, supra note 3, at 65 n.229 and accompanying text. But 
cf. 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 272 (statement of Comm'r Pittle) (CPSC 
guidance increased with each offeror proceeding); GAO STUDY, supra note 32, at 42 (CPSC 
belief that NSPI expertise and creativity could be inhibited by active CPSC direction). 
347. See Tis with CPSC employees l, 2, supra notes 330-31; OPPE REPORT, supra note 
31, at 3-9 to 10, D-18 to 19. NSPI initially learned about the two principal areas-jurisdiction 
and labels-of Commissioner concern when CPSC's proposal was published. See OPPE 
REPORT, supra note 31, at D-18. The OPPE REPORT and CPSC employees indicate that the 
jurisdiction question surfaced at the last minute because of an inadvertent oversight, but some 
modifications in NSPl's submission resulted from unwarranted Commissioner "tinkering," 
especially with labeling and warning requirements assembled by NSPI and CPSC staff. Cf. 
Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 840-43 (5th Cir. 1978) (sign requirements' 
invalidation). 
348. Two complex problems were identifying precisely how, as a biomechanical matter, 
serious injuries occurred and how, as a technological and "human factors" matter, they could 
be remedied most effectively. See Tis with CPSC employees I, 3, supra notes 330, 334. 
349. See supra note 320 and accompanying text. 
350. See supra note 326 and accompanying text. 
351. See 1977 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 319, at 68 (statement of 
Chairman Simpson). 
352. TI with CPSC employee 2, supra note 331. The individual added that NSPI developed 
a "better product than ASTM" partly because "votes only were taken on proposals the 
consultant assembled." Id. But cf. TI with CPSC employee l, supra note 330 (ASTM/NCL 
"consumer caucus far superior" to pool slides consumers). 
353. TI with CPSC employee 3, supra note 334. 
354. TI with CPSC employee 4, supra note 335. 
355. TI with CPSC employee 5. 
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refused to accept anyone's response unless she understood it.356 The Tech-
nical Director for NSPI said that citizens afforded an "excellent third 
view," asked "embarrassing questions worth answering," and "infiltrated 
all activity, offering perspectives not clouded by technical bias," thereby 
successfully urging the rejection on practical grounds of unwarranted tech-
nical requirements proposed by technical experts.357 The Naval Institute 
employee found that all of the consumers "had some association with 
pools" and "were helpful in working through the process," while a "doctor 
provided good information on slide injuries, water depth and forces" and 
a "YMCA representative offered data on the controversial issue of water 
depth.mss One citizen believed that the public had "considerable input" 
and "significant impact. " 359 
5. Television Receivers 
In June, 1975, the CPSC chose Underwriters Laboratories (UL), a 
"voluntary standards development group that conducts public safety test-
ing, " 360 to write requirements for risks associated with television receivers 
(TVR). 361 The need for regulation was debatable, given available injury 
data362 and the potential for voluntary compliance.363 UL had great difficulty 
retaining citizens, especially "use and technically oriented consumers," who 
were paid only out-of-pocket expenses.364 But many individuals, who com-
prised one-third of the working group,365 helped UL to formulate recom-
mendations which required four drafts, using a consensus approach. 366 The 
suggestions, that included a technical rationale and a cost-benefit analysis, 
were tendered to the agency in July, 1976.367 Initial evaluation by the CPSC 
revealed the need for additional public input before a proposal could be 
356. See Weiner TI, supra note 337. 
357. TI with Larry Paulick. 
358. Berghage TI, supra note 339. 
359. TI with funded participant l, supra note 340. 
360. See Hoffman & Farr, Television Receivers: The UL Experience, ASTM STANDARD-
IZATION NEWS 20, (May 1977); cf. 1976 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 240, at 
906 (George Washington University also an applicant). 
361. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,043, 24,043-44 (1975). 
362. See H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 75, at 820 (UL statement); Oct. 1977 Senate 
Oversight Hearings, supra note 184, at 62 (statement of Philip Knox); Comment, The Consumer 
Product Safety Commission: In Search of a Regulatory Pattern, 12 CoLUM. J. L. & Soc. 
PROBS. 393, 437-40 (1976). 
363. See Comment, iupra note 362, at 439. The OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-44, 
included no case study for television receivers. Cf. 40 Fed. Reg. 8,592, 8,593-94 (1975); 
Hoffman & Farr, supra note 360 (discussions of proceeding's background and of consumer 
participation by UL's project manager and participation's coordinator). 
364. See Hoffman & Farr, supra note 360, at 20-21. 
365. See id. at 21, 24; Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1414-16. 
366. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,043, 23,044 (1975) (discussion of the effort's organization and 
work); Hoffman & Farr, supra note 360 (same). 
367. See 41 Fed. Reg. 51,055, 51,056 (1976). 
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issued.368 Moreover, in early 1977, the agency claimed that UL had "pro-
vided many specifications for components and design criteria," rather than 
a performance-oriented standard, as expected.369 But, during October, 1977, 
the Commissioners reviewed the public comments solicited earlier, certain 
improvements in voluntary requirements governing television receivers, and 
data indicating that product-related injuries had decreased. 370 Finally, in 
November, the Commissioners terminated consideration of mandatory con-
trols for the principal hazards thought to be posed by television receivers, 
finding that voluntary standards adopted by UL and followed by industry 
were being "progressively upgraded" and that there had been an "apparent 
decline in TV safety-related incident data. " 371 
Opinions of the work performed by UL were widely divergent. The 
Commissioners were not very satisfied. When UL seemed to be departing 
from CPSC's original guidance and appeared unresponsive to subsequent 
agency importuning,372 the offeror was summoned to a Commissioners' 
meeting at which the off eror was informed that it was proceeding improp-
erly .373 Although UL agreed to comply with the instructions given, its 
submission still did not conf arm to the expectations of the CPSC. 374 One 
agency Chairman said that deficiencies in UL's package required CPSC to 
solicit additional public input, 315 while a Commissioner attributed this need 
to the "voluminous" nature of the "material which was little more than a 
collection of standards previously developed. " 376 But another Chairman and 
a second Commissioner admitted that the product was complex and una-
menable to compulsory controls,377 and the latter officer and an additional 
368. See id. at 51,055; 1978 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 159, at 112-114 
(statements of Chairman Byington and Comm'rs Kushner, Pittle and Franklin). 
369. See [1975-77 Transfer Binder] Cons. Prod. Safety Guide (CCH) 43,348, AT 43,348. 
See generally 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 353 (statement of Professor 
Hamilton). 
370. See 42 Fed. Reg. 57,335, 57,336 (1977). 
371. See 42 Fed. Reg. 57,335, 57,336 (1977). Consideration of mandatory requirements 
for mechanical, shock and explosion hazards was terminated and consideration of fire hazards 
was extended to April, 1979. Id.; cf. 44 Fed. Reg. 44,206, 44,208 (1979) (termination of 
consideration of fire hazards). In 1979, Chairman King said that industry compliance with 
UL's voluntary standard may have been the "reason for a substantial decrease in fires caused 
by televisions." 1980 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 72, at 16; accord H.R. 2271 
Hearings, supra note 75, at 821 (statement of UL). 
372. See OPPE STUDY, supra note 31, at 43; 1978 House Appropriations Hearings, supra 
note 159, at 115-16; 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 285; Apr. 1977 Senate 
Oversight Hearings, supra note 78, at 127 (statements of Comm'r Pittle). 
373. See 1978 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 159, at 113 (statement of 
Comm'r Pittle). 
374. Id. at 112-14. 
375. See id. (statement of Chairman Byington). 
376. See id. (statement of Comm'r Pittle). 
377. See 1977 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 319, at 27 (statement of 
Chairman Simpson); 1978 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 159, at 128 (statement 
of Comm'r Franklin). 
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Commissioner said that the CPSC may have provided inadequate guidance, 
particularly initially. 378 
Agency staff were less critical and even complimentary. One employee 
found that "UL did a superior job," improving voluntary standards and 
securing industry compliance, ascertaining from injury severity and fre-
quency that television receivers did not pose "unreasonable risk," and 
persuading the Commissioners that mandatory requirements were unneces-
sary. 379 A second staff member thought that the "drafting process was 
good" and that "UL served as a catalyst" by not waiting for CPSC to 
act, by upgrading its existing standard with "ninety percent of the require-
ments proposed" and by convincing the Commissioners to reject compulsory 
controls. 380 A third employee believed that "UL did a more decent job than 
some offerors but was industry oriented" and selected citizens who lacked 
advocacy skills or technical expertise.381 
A doctor and an attorney who participated actively in several agency 
proceedings said that television receivers was a "fiasco," primarily because 
UL agreed to defer to CPSC's decision that the product presented unrea-
sonable risk but challenged that determination, once selected as the of-
feror. 382 UL asserted that ''ninety-seven percent of the'mandatory' 
requirements" adopted during proposed standard development were included 
in its standard with which industry complied; that injuries attributable to 
television receivers have plummeted; and that consumers have "reasonable 
safety [with] minimum regulatory expense and irritation."383 
But UL and many others have indicated that the CPSC may be 
responsible for perceived deficiencies in the offeror's endeavors. The agen-
cy's original risk assessment and concomitant determination that mandatory 
controls were necessary might have been inaccurate, 384 and CPSC may have 
furnished insufficient initial guidance. 385 Commission incident data also 
complicated work. Television receivers were said to be improperly blamed 
for many accidents, so that "committee members had to decide" which 
378. See 1978 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 159, at 113-14 (statements of 
Comm'rs Kushner and Franklin). 
379. TI with CPSC employee 1. The individual added that UL "taught him a lot as a 
young CPSC manager, especially about playing fast and loose with data." Id. 
380. TI with CPSC employee 2. 
381. TI with CPSC employee 3. 
382. See S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 23 (statement of Robert Goldstone); S.644 
Hearings, supra note 77, at 92 (statement of David Swankin). 
383. See H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 75, at 820-21 (UL statement); Tl with CPSC 
employee 2, supra note 380. 
384. See supra note 362 and accompanying text; S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 153 
(statement of Baron Whitaker). But cf. 1980 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 72, 
at 16 (statement of Chairman King); 1979 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 160, at 
46 (statement of Michael Brown) (CPSC initiation of proceeding prompted industry voluntary 
standard work). 
385. See supra note 378 and accompanying text. 
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data were germane and what "problems would be approached, and how."386 
There was as well too little time for proposed standard development; indeed, 
tJL was granted an extension, due to expanding "need for extensive testing 
and evaluation, late availability of much subpoenaed data and time needed 
to analyze it, and increasing standard complexity."387 In short, UL's work 
seemed respectable in light of the limitations. 
CPSC assessments of citizens were positive. One official said that they 
made "substantial contributions," especially affording the "new dimension 
of end users saying that mandatory standards were unnecessary" and that 
UL's approach was more cost effective.388 A Commission lawyer found that 
many individuals were "helpful and knowledgeable, " 389 while a technical 
expert believed that several electrical engineering professors were "quite 
valuable in key areas. " 390 
The Project Manager for UL said consumers voted to inform the agency 
that television receivers posed no unreasonable risk and that mandatory 
controls were unnecessary, input which influenced the final decision of the 
CPSC.391 The Project Manager observed that technical citizens "served as 
a balance to manufacturers. " 392 "Use-oriented consumers [related] experi-
ences with, or opinions about, [product hazards] and use and care instruc-
tions," while explaining "how consumers actually use TVs. " 393 Some lay 
participants made "many contributions to the technical discussions" but 
others "felt unable to vote on certain technical issues."394 In sum, the 
official found that each individual "had a unique place," that they provided 
balance which "was of utmost importance," and that citizen activity was 
"excellent. " 395 
6. Miniature Christmas Tree Lights 
In June, 1977, NCL, a nonprofit consumer advocacy organization, was 
selected by the CPSC to developed requirements for hazards the agency 
believed were associated with miniature Christmas tree lights (MCTL). 396 
386. Hoffman & Farr, supra note 360, at 21; accord Comment, supra note 362, at 438-
39. 
387. See GAO STUDY, supra note 32, at 41; 1977 House Appropriations Hearings, supra 
note 319, at 27 (statement of Chairman Simpson); 40 Fed. Reg. 51,222, 51,223 (1975). 
388. Tl with CPSC employee 2, supra note 380. 
389. TI with CPSC employee 3, supra note 381. 
390. TI with CPSC employee 4. 
391. See TI with David Hoffman, UL project manager for TVRs. 
392. See Hoffman & Farr, supra note 360, at 23. 
393. Id. at 24. 
394. Id. The latter lacked technical experience. Id. Cf. Tis with CPSC employees 1, 2, 
supra notes 380-81 (speculation that lay consumers could become confused or could become 
dependent on others when considering complex technical issues). 
395. See Hoffman & Farr, supra note 360, at 21-22, 24. 
396. See 42 Fed. Reg. 33,359, 33,361 (1977); cf. Note, supra note 27, at 1177 n.26 (NCL 
description); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 66-88 (summary of proceeding); 43 Fed. Reg. 19, 136-
37 (1978) (discussion of proceeding's background). There is no MCTL case study because the 
OPPE REPORT issued before the MCTLs proceeding was completed. 
454 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:409 
The necessity for regulation apparently was questionable, given the potential 
for voluntary compliance397 as well as the small risk posed by, and the 
number of injuries attributable to, the product.398 This was the last offeror 
initiative, and CPSC drew upoh prior experience and recommendations of 
the OPPE and of the NCL to revise substantially the agency's role: "The 
Commission limited the hazards . . . to the two most serious ones [The 
NOP] [1] included an extensive discussion of the strengths and weaknesses 
of existing standards [and] [2] announced the availability of [data] responsive 
to the notice [and of CPSC funding for] consumer participants .... " 399 
Numerous citizens, including several "well-trained consumer advocates," 
were paid to participate. 400 They formed a caucus for purposes of commu-
nication and reinforcement, and the caucus had access to engineers, econ-
omists and behavioral scientists as well as laboratory facilities, so that 
proposals aired during proposed standard development could be assessed.401 
In November, NCL proffered its suggestions to the Commission.402 The 
CPSC staff analyzed the recommendations, conducted more tests to ascertain 
the efficacy of some restrictions in addressing hazards,403 and prepared 
labeling because only general directions were provided by the off eror. 404 The 
Commissioners then reviewed NCL's submission, decided that some modi-
fications in it and certain additional requirements were needed, made the 
requisite changes and issued a proposal in May, 1978.405 Thereafter, major 
397. See H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 149 (statement of Aaron Locker); 1978 
Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 85, at 1702-03 (statement of Senator Proxmire). 
But cf. id. (statement of Chairman Byington) (CPSC commenced proceeding because voluntary 
compliance inadequate, ad hoc enforcement inefficient, lawsuit); accord as to second, 1979 
House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 160, at 466 (statements of Comm'rs Franklin, 
Pittle). 
398. See H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 149 (statement of Aaron Locker); 1978 
Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 85, at 1702-03 (statement of Senator Proxmire); 
infra note 429. 
399. S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 200-02 (statement of Chairman Byington); accord 
1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 251, 263-64 (statements of Comm'r Pittle, 
David Swankin); Apr. 1977 Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 78, at 126 (statement of 
Comm'r Kushner). 
400. See 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 263 (statement of David 
Swankin). 
401. See id.; S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 201 (statement of Chairman Byington); 
cf. id. at 200-03; 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 263-65 (discussions of 
work's organization and consumer activity). 
402. See 42 Fed. Reg. 19,136, 19,137 (1977) (discussion of suggestions). 
403. Id. at 19,137; accord TI with CPSC employee 1. One concern was a sophisticated, 
but unrefined, methodology developed by NCL which was recognized as needing more work 
when submitted. See 1979 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 160 at 465-67 (statements 
of Chairman Byington, Comm'rs Franklin & Pittle); cf. id. at 466 (statement of Comm'r 
Franklin) (delay was fault of offerer process not of NCL). 
404. See 1979 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 135, at 262 (statement of 
Chairman Byington); 43 Fed. Reg. 19,136, 19,137 (1978). 
405. See 43 Fed. Reg. 19,136, 19,137 (1978) (discussion of changes); Hamilton, supra 
note 35, at 1415-16 (NCL draft was "much closer to CPSC's views" but it still was revised 
by CPSC). 
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industry groups-UL, representing domestic producers, and the National 
Ornament and Electric Lights Association (NOEL), representing importing 
interests-upgraded voluntary standards to satisfy strictures in the agency 
proposal. 406 The CPSC terminated the initiative, once persuaded that indus-
try would comply.407 Thus, although the miniature Christmas tree lights 
initiative was touted as the most successful proceeding, its outcome was 
similar to the television receivers matter. 408 
CPSC personnel generally found NCL to be quite competent. A Chair-
man said that its submission "was probably the most all-inclusive" standard 
tendered by any offeror and that proposed standard development had been 
much less costly and resource-intensive than if done in-house; that NCL's 
"experience and managerial skill [and] astute examination" of past weak-
nesses led to "highly effective management [and] an outstanding effort;" 
and that the off eror assured that all views were considered fully and that 
agency staff actively were involved the entire time, defending their ideas 
"in an open forum consisting of industry, consumers and experts."409 The 
Chairman did admit, however, that the manager of NCL's endeavor under-
stood the process and that the product was relatively simple, so that 
cumulative experience and existing standards facilitated work. 410 
A Commissioner found that NCL's submission was "one of the finest," 
including several "state-of-the-art provisions" and some novel ones which 
were "completely justified. " 411 But the official observed that the CPSC 
revised the off eror process and its role; the agency provided more "front-
end" analysis, especially by narrowing the "number and scope of hazards," 
greater data on solutions, expanded citizen funding and enhanced staff 
participation.412 Moreover, the official claimed that Commission staff spent 
much time working on NCL's suggestions413 and that the proceeding still 
406. See 46 Fed. Reg. 17,788, 17,789 (1981); H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 75, at 339 
(statement of Acting Chairman Statler); 1980 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 72, 
at 16, 57-58 (statement of Chairman King); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 67 n.245 and accom-
panying text. 
407. See, e.g., S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 200-02 (statement of Chairman 
Byington); 1979 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 3, at 66-68; cf. supra note 399 
and accompanying text (r~ons why MCTL proceeding successful) .. 
408. See 46 Fed. Reg. 45,940, 45,941 (1981); supra note 371 and accompanying text. See 
generally National Ornament & Elec. Lights Ass'n v. CPSC, 526 F.2d 1368, 1373 (2d Cir. 
1975) Gudicial rejection of challenge to CPSC information campaign on MCTLS). 
409. See S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 200-02 (statement of Chairman Byington). 
But cf. TI with CPSC employee 1, supra note 403 (standard development consumed "more 
staff time than if developed in-house"). 
410. See S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 200-08 (statement of Chairman Byington). 
411. See H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 67; 1979 House Appropriations 
Hearings, supra note 160, and 467 (statements of Commissioner Pittle). 
412. See H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 67; 1979 House Appropriations 
Hearings, supra note 160, at 467 (statements of Commissioner Pittle). 
413. See 1979 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 160, at 467; 1977 House 
Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 251; H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 61. 
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was lengthy.414 The Commissioner added that the initiative was "quite 
unique" _:MCTLs were simple, posing easily remedied risks; intra-industry 
competition meant that issues were "clearly defined and technically sup-
ported;" the manager for the NCL had years of experience;415 and the 
CPSC did so much initial research that it could have completed the work 
more expeditiously.416 Two other Commissioners waxed eloquent in Congres-
sional testimony about the enhanced quality of standard development in 
this proceeding but the officials were speaking less to the efforts of NCL, 
than to CPSC improvements.417 
Agency staff were less positive. One employee found that standard 
development was more "administratively successful" and was characterized 
by "hot and heavy debate and healthy exchanges, " 418 while a second staffer 
thought that the MSTL proceeding was "one of the better initiatives."419 
Another employee said that the NCL "did the best job" possible, given the 
new procedure, but that some material the offeror tendered was revised and 
that the project could have been finished more quickly in-house. 420 A fourth 
staff member believed that NCL organized citizens well, "helping them 
articulate their views and not letting them be pushed around," but prepared 
recommendations that were too complex and hired consultants who seemed 
unable to draft effective requirements.421 
The manager for the NCL claimed that this was the "most successful 
proceeding," describing proposed standard development as "quicl~, efficient, 
supported and open-ended. " 422 Moreover, the offeror instituted a novel, 
two-tiered standard writing system, joining "technical and scientific models 
of peer review with legal principles of appellate review,'' whereby the review 
panel attended technical meetings to "understand what their decisionmaking 
was about. " 423 The manager added that NCL organized the citizens into a 
caucus and provided them testing facilities;424 promoted "real interchange" 
among the caucus, industry representatives and CPSC; maximized the 
414. See H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 67; 1979 House Appropriations 
Hearings, supra note 160, at 467. 
415. See H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 61; 1977 House Oversight Hearings, 
supra note 34, at 252. 
416. See 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 252. 
417. See, e.g., Apr. 1977 Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 78, at 126 (statement of 
Comm'r Kushner); 1979 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 160, at 466; H.R. 10,819 
Hearings, supra note 248 at 58 (statements of Comm'r Franklin). 
418. TI with CPSC employee 1, supra note 403. 
419. TI with CPSC employee 2. 
420. TI with CPSC employee 3. 
421. TI with CPSC employee 4. 
422. See Swankin Tls, supra notes 272, 273. The individual added that if all of the 
proceedings had functioned as smoothly as this one, the procedure might still be in use. 
Swankin TI I, supra note 272. 
423. See Swankin Tls, supra notes 272, 273. 
424. See Swankin TI I, supra note 272; 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, 
at 263. 
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perspectives expressed and their consideration in decisionmaking; encouraged 
agency staff involvement, thus expediting later Commission review; and 
facilitated work by dismissing irrelevant questions.425 
The Executive Vice-President of the NCL said that the offeror "spared 
a lot of ill will" and saved the CPSC much time, umpiring "industry 
squabbling" and affording expert technical help as well as a forum where 
"importers, U.L., retailers, and everyone who wanted" could participate, 
the problems of small and large firms, importers and testing laboratories 
might be aired and documented, and minority ideas could be registered so 
"all thought they had fair hearings. " 426 NCL also brought "divergent 
viewpoints in before the fact" and gave CPSC a "variety of recommen-
dations [and a] complete record," which was documented thoroughly, so 
that the Commission could make an "informed choice between alterna-
tives. " 427 
A lawyer for the NOEL stated that there already were "two existing 
voluntary standards" so that the NCL could "develop an amalgam. " 428 
Although producers generally felt that they were listened to and that many 
decisions made during the proposed standard development process were 
sound and in consumers' interest,429 industry opposed mandatory controls 
as unnecessary.430 Nevertheless, manfacturers were able to quantify the safety 
of miniature Christmas tree lights and to develop a standard that was 
acceptable to the "most critical engineers" at the National Bureau of 
Standards (NBS) in eight months.431 
Outside evaluators find that miniature Christmas tree lights was one of 
the most productive offeror proceedings but not due exclusively to the 
efforts of the NCL. Professor Schwartz thought that the proposed standard 
development stage was successful because NCL possessed experience that it 
had gleaned from participating in the matchbooks initiative and had a 
"skilled manager who worked well with diverse interest groups and hired 
consultants with strong technical expertise. " 432 Nonetheless, she also ascribed 
success to improved CPSC procedures; the simple nature of the product; 
extant voluntary requirements that were a good starting point; and the 
interests of manufacturers who were "motivated to find" a voluntary 
solution.433 Professor Hamilton believed that the proposed standard devel-
opment effort was more successful in that the draft tendered by the offeror 
425. See 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 260-68, 272, 287. 
426. See 1981 Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 180, at 81; H.R. 2271 Hearings, 
supra note 75, at 80 (statements of Sandra Willett). 
427. See 1981 Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 180, at 81. 
428. TI with Aaron Locker. 
429. The lawyer claimed "there were 17 incidents associated with the product in the year 
prior to commencement of the proceeding." Id. 
430. H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 149. 
431. Locker Tl, supra note 428. 
432. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 67. 
433. See id.; at 67-68. 
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was closer to agency views of what was appropriate but the evaluator 
ascribed the perceived "improvement" principally to initial CPSC work, 
while observing that NCL's·submission still had to be revised.434 One citizen 
who had been involved in other agency initiatives said that the NCL 
"produced a reasonable standard on schedule" because the offeror was 
"dedicated to making the process work," never disputing the Commission's 
original unreasonable risk determination, and because the CPSC provided 
guidance, consumer funding and technical assistance. 435 A second member 
of the public found that this effort was more efficient because agency "staff 
were intimately involved," answering questions throughout proposed stand-
ard development. 436 
Appraisals of Citizens were less complimentary. A Chairman considered 
them ""outstandingly qualified, interested and dependable," describing their 
input as "consistent, well-documented, intensive and material to the stand-
ard's outcome. " 437 The Program Manager for the CPSC thought that a 
"lot of effort went into getting consumers up to speed," but that they 
"added nothing new. " 438 A second staffer found that citizens "made points 
effectively and supported them, " 439 while a third employee believed that 
they had "pretty good labeling suggestions" but offered little on very 
technical issues.440 
The manager for the NCL said that consumers "created new end product 
testing" and even joined "industry to fight staff when it second guessed 
technical aspects" of the offeror's submission.441 An NCL officer thought 
that citizens mastered "technical aspects of the subject" and made "sub-
stantial contributions to a traditionally narrow field," forcing industry to 
explain technical factors.442 One consultant for the NCL claimed that several 
recalcitrant consumers could have "wrecked the project" but proved helpful 
once they were "confronted by engineers and asked to cooperate. " 443 The 
attorney for the NOEL believed that those who contributed most worked 
for UL or industry and that lay consumers could not appreciate technical 
issues implicated "in developing electrical standards. " 444 A doctor added 
that participant funding enabled citizens to be effective. 445 
434. See Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1415-16. 
435. TI with funded participant I. 
436. Tl with funded participant 2. 
437. See S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 200-08 (statement of Chairman Byington). 
438. TI with CPSC employee 2, supra note 419. 
439. See TI with CPSC employee 3, supra note 420. 
440. See TI with CPSC employee 4, supra note 421. 
441. Swankin TI, supra note 272. 
442. See 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 343 (statement of Sandra 
Willett). 
443. Weiner TI, supra note 337. 
444. See Locker TI, supra note 428. 
445. See S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 29, 33 (statement of Robert Goldstone). 
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7. Public Playground Equipment 
In August, 1975, the National Recreation and Parks Association (NRPA) 
was chosen by the CPSC to develop standards for public playground 
equipment.446 There apparently was questionable need for mandatory con-
trols, given the source of most injuries ascribed to the equipment and the 
difficulties entailed in treating them with compulsory requirements.447 CPSC 
informed NRP A shortly after the off eror was selected that the agency 
probably lacked "jurisdiction over" surfaces underlying public playground 
equipment. 448 The NRP A, a "non-profit, public interest, research and 
educational organization" had worked on "somewhat technical standards 
for recreational facilities" but had been only a commentator on earlier 
industry efforts to formulate voluntary requirements.449 Moreover, NRPA 
was chosen despite reservations expressed by several CPSC bureaus about 
the offeror's abilities, concerns which neither were resolved by proposed 
standard development's inception nor communicated to NRPA.450 Many 
citizens assisted the NRPA, while five were on the development committee.451 
The offeror experienced difficulties in commencing and managing the process 
and met with agency staff about the problems.452 The Commissioners told 
the offeror that it was proceeding incorrectly and threatened to terminate 
NRP A but permitted the offeror to continue work which it completed in 
May, 1976.453 However, some difficulties anticipated by CPSC apparently 
materialized because it found that NRP A's technical rationale and test 
methods posed problems and the agency had to ask the NBS to undertake 
446. See 40 Fed. Reg. 10,706, 10,707 (1975); cf id. at 10,706-07 (discussion of decision 
not to rely upon CPSA but rather Federal Hazardous Substances Act and "offeror-like" 
procedures). See 40 Fed. Reg. 33,703, 33,704 (1975) (relating to NRPA's selection); cf OPPE 
REPORT, supra note 31, at D-40 (Unimat Industries, a producer, also was an applicant); id. 
at D-40 to D-43; 40 Fed. Reg. 10,706, 10,706-09 (1975); 44 Fed. Reg. 57,352, 57,352-53 (1979) 
(discussion of proceeding's background). 
447. See infra notes 457, 459, 484-85 and accompanying text. 
448. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-10. 
449. See id. at D-40 to D-41. 
450. See id. at D-41 to D-42, 4-12. One bureau "found NRPA's offer marginally 
acceptable" and requested more procedural specificity; a second bureau "had many reservations 
and conditions of acceptance," finding the offer insufficiently specific about technical and 
management experience, work descriptions, responsibility for execution and test development 
and procedures; and a third bureau expressed "concern that the development schedule was 
too crowded" and "found the technical plan unacceptable" because it inadequately discussed 
procedures, personnel and working groups' operation. Id. at D-41 to D-42. 
451. See 40 Fed. Reg. 33,703, 33,703 (1975); cf id. at 33,703-04; OPPE REPORT, supra 
note 31, at D-43 to 43 (discussion of committee composition and work's organization). 
452. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 5-6 to 5-7. 
453. See 1978 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 159, at 116 (relating to 
threatening termination); 1977 Oversight Hearings, supra note 79, at 286 (statements of Comm'r 
Pittle) (same); OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 5-7 (December, 1975, CPSC determination of 
inadequate offeror performance); 44 Fed. Reg. 57,352, 57,353 (1979) (relating to work's 
completion). 
460 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:409 
"technical work needed to revise" the offeror's submission.454 The CPSC 
then held several public meetings in which it funded a "consumer long 
active in" the field of public playground equipment and injuries to chil-
dren. 455 In early 1979, NBS completed three reports which included safety 
guidelines and data on surfaces beneath public playground equipment. 456 
The CPSC then concluded that "what could be mandated [legally] was 
being done."457 In October, 1979, the Commissioners announced that they 
would publish the NBS documents as guidance for producers, buyers and 
the public458 because compulsory controls alone could not treat adequately 
public playground equipment injuries, especially the large number attribut-
able to surfaces underlying the equipment.459 The agency solicited public 
comment on the substance of the NBS reports and on the advisability of 
issuing them as guidelines, paying seven entities to off er their viewpoints. 460 
The CPSC used the input received to revise the NBS documents and 
published them as guidelines,461 thus eschewing mandatory controls, the 
attempted development of which had cost 800,000 dollars.462 Unsuccessful 
suit challenging issuance of the reports as guidelines ended one of the most 
frustrating initiatives, 463 an endeavor which ironically may have improved 
the safety of public playground equipment. 464 
Many have criticized the efforts of the NRP A. One staffer for the 
CPSC found that NRPA was "consistently confused," that its proposed 
454. See 44 Fed. Reg. 57,352, 57,353 (1979); cf. OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 4-13 
(bureau concerns seemed to become realities). 
455. See 1979 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 135, at 264. The consumer had 
been involved in the proposed standard development phase. 
456. See 44 Fed. Reg. 57,352, 57,352-53 (1979); cf. id. at 57,353-54 (discussion of reports). 
457. TI with CPSC employee 1. 
458. See 44 Fed. Reg. 57,352, 57,353 (1979). 
459. See id. at 57,352-53. Many have identified surfaces onto which children fall as an 
important source of playground injuries. See, e.g., TI with CPSC employee 1, supra note 457; 
TI with CPSC employee 2; Tis with funded participants 1, 2; TI with Robert Beuchner, 
NRPA Project Director. Cf. S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 53 (Office of General Counsel 
opinion that CPSC could require negative surfaces labeling). 
460. See 44 Fed. Reg. 57,352, 57,353-55 (1979). The seven included NRPA and funded 
participant 2, supra note 459. 
461. See 1982 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 143, at 837 (statement of Acting 
Chairman Statler); cf. H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 75, at 837-72 (reprinted reports). 
462. From fiscal 1975 to 1979, CPSC "spent $832,000 to develop a mandatory safety 
standard for public playground equipment." 1982 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 
143, at 837 (statement of Acting Chairman Statler). 
463. See Howell Playground Equipment Co. v. CPSC, No. 91-2071, Slip op. (7th Cir., 
Apr. 10, 1981) (plaintiffs' contention that issuance of reports as guidance would deprive them 
of liberty or property was rejected); cf. TI with CPSC employee 3; OPPE REPORT, supra note 
31, at 3-10 to 3-11 (frustration). 
464. See TI with CPSC employee 2, supra note 459 ("No one makes public playground 
equipment without following the guidelines"); cf. Hearings on Dep't of Housing and Urban 
Dev.-lndep. Agencies Appropriations for 1984 Before the Subcomm. for HUD-lndep. 
Agencies of the House Appropriations Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 59 (1983) 
[hereinafter 1984 House Appropriations Hearings] (CPSC assertion that handbooks apparently 
contributed to improved playground safety). 
i 
I 
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standard development consumed the most time, and that its "work was the 
most marginal. " 465 Another agency employee said that ''what emerged were 
totally unworkable untested ideas which failed to address real injury pos-
sibilities," ascribing these phenomena to NRPA's lack of technical profi-
ciency, industry and consumer recalcitrance, and CPSC deficiencies.466 A 
third staff member stated that the "initial submission was revised almost 
one hundred percent;" the offeror's proposal included many technical 
requirements, especially numerical limitations, which were not substantiated, 
"well developed, or defined," thus necessitating NBS testing to identify 
"justifiable tolerance levels and to supply supporting rationales."467 An 
employee of the NBS agreed that little technical data underlie many require-
ments recommended by the NRPA so NBS "ran tests and performed 
additional work to support" some of the requirements suggested and revised 
others.468 
Concerns about the dearth of substantiation were echoed by additional 
people and entities, 469 and by the Commissioners who also questioned the 
"validity, repeatability, and reproductibility" of NRP A testing.470 The NRPA 
experienced difficulty commencing work and securing committee decisions 
and often consulted agency staff about administrative and technical defi-
ciencies. 471 The Commissioners informed the offeror that it was proceeding 
improperly;472 threatened to terminate NRPA if it failed to expedite work;473 
seriously considered terminating the offeror or having CPSC monitors 
conduct meetings while instructing them to "act almost as a co-chairman;"474 
and issued a "determination of inadequate performance."475 the NRPA 
promised to follow the Commissioners' instructions when notified of per-
ceived deficiencies in its performance but disregarded these instructions, 
tendering a submission which was not very helpful to the agency in treating 
the risks associated with public playground equipment. 476 Even the Project 
Manager for the NRPA, in compiling a list of "lessons learned,'' enumerated 
465. TI with CPSC employee 3, supra note 463. The individual also recognized "it was 
an awfully ambitious effort." 
466. TI with CPSC employee 2, supra note 459. 
467. TI with CPSC employee 3, supra note 463. 
468. See TI with NBS employee 1. 
469. See, e.g., TI with CPSC employee 3, supra note 463; OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, 
at 5-6. 
470. See 44 Fed. Reg. 57,352, 57,352 (1979). 
471. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 5-6 to 5-7. The "meetings did not have a 
strong impact because the offerer-manager expressed surprise at the Commission's determi-
nation of inadequate performance." Id. at 5-7. 
472. See 1978 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 159, at 166; 1977 House 
Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 286 (statements of Comm'r Pittle). 
473. See supra note 453 (listing of pertinent sources). 
474. See 1978 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 159, at 116; 1977 House 
Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 286 (statements of Comm'r Pittle). 
475. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 5-7. 
476. 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 286 (statement of Comm'r Pittle). 
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many that might have facilitated proposed standard development.477 An 
industry employee said that the offeror "needed a standard writer and 
realized that it lacked" the requisite expertise.478 A funded citizen asserted 
that NRP A was "very biased," assembling a standard development com-
mittee comprised of half as many consumers as "industry-oriented" people 
so that the "bloc" created opposed imposition of any safety requirements. 479 
Some observers, however, were more positive. One trade association 
representative found that the NRPA "did a pretty good job completing an 
overwhelming task."480 A Commission staffer thought the offeror "did an 
extremely good job," organized and focused work, minimized adversarial 
relationships, and assembled valuable data from many disciplines, such as 
that on child psychology and physiology.481 
Much that happened during proposed standard development may have 
been beyond NRPA's control but within CPSC's power. The breadth of 
the charge given the offeror might have doomed the effort from the outset.482 
Moreover, the tardy jurisdictional decision made by the Commission addi-
tionally· complicated a complex project and alienated participants, eliminat-
ing from consideration what was later determined to be the major source 
of injuries-surfaces beneath the equipment. 483 The expectation that the 
NRP A would develop a satisfactory mandatory solution may have been 
unrealistic, in light of subsequent inability of the NBS and the CPSC to do 
so484 as well as agency admissions that many injuries could not treated with 
compulsory controls. 485 NRPA was selected, although several Commission 
bureaus evinced doubts about the offeror's competence, while agency staff 
apparently supplied deficient data which delayed work, seemingly provided 
little guidance, allegedly prejudged the outcome and even might have lost 
interest once it became clear that the NRP A was having difficulty and that 
no easy solution existed.486 The NRPA had to "start from scratch,'' as 
477. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 4-13. 
478. TI with industry representative 1. 
479. TI with funded participant 1, supra note 459; S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 
52-55 (statement of Theodora Sweeney). The individual added that NRPA's selection meant 
that the "die was already cast for the defeat of the consumer interest." Id. at 52. Moreover, 
she observed that industry successfully blocked mandatory standard issuance. TI with funded 
participant 1, supra note 459. 
480. TI with industry representative 1. 
481. TI with CPSC employee 1, supra note 457. The individual also said that the 
development committee believed "something needed fixing but was unsure how to do it" and 
tried to remedy everything which slowed the proposed standard development effort. Id. 
482. See TI with CPSC Employee 2, supra note 459; 40 Fed. Reg. 10,706, 10,706 (1975) 
(appearance in the NOP of CPSC's charge to NRPA). 
483. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-10. 
484. See supra notes 454, 456-59, 462 and accompanying text; cf. Beuchner TI, supra 
note 459 (CPSC and NBS not much more successful); TI with CPSC employee l, supra note 
457 (NRPA undertook "awfully ambitious effort"). 
485. See 44 Fed. Reg. 57,352, 57,352-53 (1979). 
486. See supra note 450 and accompanying text (relating to NRPA's selection); OPPE 
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there were few accident studies or hazard analyses, and was required to 
treat an apparently unsolvable problem.487 
A number of these difficulties may have been exacerbated by citizens, 
although many evaluators agreed that "taxpayers got their money's worth." 
The analysts said that consumers improved safety; worked very hard; 
educated themselves, learning all that was possible about the issues and 
developing reasonable solutions; provided necessary balance, challenging 
industry and keeping it honest; identified important questions for discussion; 
afforded new, keener insights, such as reminders about the terrible nature 
of children's injuries; and promoted the articulation of technical ration-
ales. 488 But even the positive tone of this commentary must be qualified 
because some citizens so distrusted industry that they slowed work or were 
ineffective; were disconcerting or disruptive; lacked proficiency in technical 
areas or the ability to provide substantiation for their perspectives or the 
controls imposed; or had little effect on CPSC's ultimate decision.489 More-
over, other evaluators believed that certain consumers were unable to 
overcome biases, were so critical that they had no impact, were deliberately 
obstructive, or were merely promoting personal or political interests or were 
fighting among themselves for power.490 
Some of these criticisms seem applicable to the person funded to 
participate in the public meetings. A Commission staff er described the 
individual as a "thorn in the proceedings, who established herself as 
consumer adversary" and who summarily rejected as premised on "ulterior 
motives" proposals offered by industry and others.491 An industry attorney 
said that the "art of compromise was almost totally alien" to the consumer 
who was so critical that the person was "totally ineffective." 492 Although 
these assessments appear to implicate style, the CPSC adopted few of the 
advocate's substantive suggestions. However, several seem valid or were 
addressed: agency staff found that the consumer raised "legitimate concerns 
about some" provisions in the material submitted by the NRPA but that 
REPORT, supra note 31. The assertions as to staff were gleaned principally from interviewing 
those familiar with the proceeding and partially from the OPPE REPORT. See OPPE REPORT, 
supra. 
487. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31 (assertions were gleaned principally from inter-
viewing those familiar with the proceeding and partially from the OPPE REPORT). 
488. These assertions were gleaned from interviewing those familiar with the proceeding, 
but funded participants were impressed more favorably than CPSC employees who were 
impresed more favorably than industry representatives. 
489. These assertions were gleaned from interviewing those familiar with the proceeding. 
The degree of favorable impression observed, however, is similar here, although CPSC 
employees were more critical. See supra note 488 (discussion of favorable impressions). 
490. These criticisms came principally from industry representatives, but some were made 
by CPSC employees. Several people whom I interviewed claimed some consumers thought that 
all manufacturers were "out to kill children" while some manufacturers thought that all 
consumers were "out to destroy industry." 
491. See TI with CPSC employee 3, supra note 463. 
492. See TI with industry representative 2. 
464 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:409 
the solutions offered "severely underestimated" cost, were "subjective" and 
lacked supporting test data.493 Moreover, the individual contended that the 
input provided caused the Commission's "general counsel to study" the 
possibility of labeling and that the official adopted the views offered.494 
The funded public comments on the NBS reports generally seem to 
have been better. Two agency staffers who analyzed the submissions said 
that numerous ideas proferred were considered seriously and that several 
recommendations strongly influenced CPSC resolution of questions at issue 
or actually were included in the guidelines ultimately published. 495 A "con-
structive suggestion used in preparing the handbooks" was that "technical 
data for manufacturers" appear in a section separate from that providing 
practical material for consumers.496 One agency employee thought that a 
few of the compensated submissions did not significantly help the CPSC in 
revising the NBS documents, but the staffer assigned "high ratings to 
some," especially for "keen insights on the real world of children's play 
that regulators as manipulators of magic numbers" lack.497 A technical 
expert from the NBS found that some comments were "very valid and 
worth addressing" and that others were "anecdotal and not too relevant. " 498 
A third Commission employee agreed, adding that "those paid the most 
did not submit the best comments, " 499 while a fourth agency staff member 
said the input "essentially repeated earlier suggestions."500 My reading 
confirms these evaluations: two reimbursed comments were uncritical; three 
compensated submissions were premised more on anecdotes and personal 
opinions than on data; three were extensive; and two were sophisticated. soi 
III. CONCLUSIONS FROM CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION 
EXPERIMENTATION WITH THE OFFEROR PROCESS 
A. Specific Conclusions 
1. Benefits and Disadvantages of Government Sponsored Public 
Participation 
Government supported nonindustry participation in the offeror initia-
tives conducted by the CPSC had numerous salutary effects throughout 
493. See CPSC Memorandum from Terry Rogers to Elaine Besson (Mar. 16, 1978). 
494. See TI with funded participant 1, supra note 459; cf. id. (consumer developed much 
valuable data). See generally CPSC Memorandum, supra note 493 (more discussion of con-
sumer's input). 
495. See Tl with CPSC employee 3, supra note 463; TI with CPSC employee 4. 
496. See CPSC Memorandum from Terry Rogers to Elaine Besson (Dec. 18, 1980). 
497. Tl with CPSC employee 1, supra note 457. 
498. TI with NBS employee 1, supra note 468. 
499. See TI with CPSC employee 5. 
500. See TI with CPSC employee 2, supra note 459. 
501. See comments available in CPSC files. 
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proposed standard development and Commission decisional processes.502 For 
instance, reimbursed individuals and entities fashioned felicitous frameworks 
for decisionmaking at the commencement of the processes and thereafter 
offered novel information or new perspectives on questions already in 
dispute, and many of these contributions were relied upon by decisionmakers 
in resolving issues or in supporting determinations reached.503 Moreover, 
the quality of compensated involvement could fairly be characterized as 
respectable.504 For example, much of the input was accurate while most of 
the ideas asserted were advocated effectively.505 Participant funding also 
afforded a number of advantages which pertain less closely to decisionmak-
ing processes. Reimbursement promoted participation by individuals and 
organizations whose interests theretofore had been underrepresented, if 
championed at all; remedied an imbalance in information and views pre-
sented to those involved in proposed standard development and ultimately 
to the Commission; and was rather inexpensive, especially in contrast to 
other devices for securing the requisite input on which decisions are prem-
ised. 506 
However, compensated participation also was inefficacious, having det-
rimental or minimal effect on decisional processes; lacked quality; and had 
deleterious ramifications related less directly to decisionmaking.507 Funded 
contributions were repetitive, incorrect or unsubstantiated, which could have 
the significant harmful implication of delay. Certain reimbursed people and 
entities lacked the ability to articulate fairly or clearly their views, and a 
few simply did not have negotiating skills. Government funding occasionally 
failed to facilitate participation by individuals or groups that previously had 
not been involved in decisional processes or to alter meaningfully the 
imbalance in data and perspectives conveyed to decisionmakers or the 
composition of participants in decisional processes. sos 
502. The benefits and disadvantages that follow constitute a cursory and selective, although 
representative, summary of the proceeding-specific assessment in § H.B. which derives 
examples from the analysis. As in that evaluation, the focus is on the proposed standard 
development phase even though much said also applies to the second, intra-agency stage of 
standard development. 
503. There obviously are many other advantages. See Tobias, supra note 2, at § III.A.I. 
(listing number of other advantages, most of which apply to the offeror proceedings); Tobias, 
supra note 3, at § IV.A. (same). 
504. Quality and efficacy are not completely distinct concepts. Cf. supra notes 42-43 and 
accompanying text (description of both). 
505. See Tobias, supra note 2, at § III.A.I. (listing other examples, most of which apply 
to the offeror initiatives). 
506. See id. (other benefits, most of which apply to the offeror proceedings); id. at n.357 
(more discussion of relative expense in an analogous context). Indeed, so little was paid those 
funded in the offeror process that the value of their input may have been jeopardized. See 
notes 27-28 and accompanying text. But cf. infra note 513 and accompanying text (offeror 
process costly). 
507. Numerous disadvantages were essentially the opposites of the advantages. 
508. See Tobias, supra note 2, at § III.A.I. (listing other disadvantages, most of which 
apply to the offeror initiatives); Tobias, supra note 3, at § IV.B. (same). 
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Nonetheless, most of these difficulties can be treated or at least their 
worst aspects can be ameliorated.509 But a few of the problems may not be 
amenable to solution or they could be the fixed costs of an otherwise 
worthwhile enterprise. 510 Perhaps most interesting was that the efficacy and 
quality of compensated involvement were so respectable, given the consid-
erable constraints imposed, especially by the offeror process itself. 
2. The Offeror Process and Its Implications for 
Government Sponsored Public Participation 
a. Benefits and Disadvantages of the Off eror Process 
The off eror process afforded some advantages as a mechanism for 
standard setting. For ihstance, it was rather expeditious, particularly in 
comparison to other techniques for developing standards.m Indeed, there 
may have been a few situations in which the procedure could have been 
applied effectively, although at considerable expense and no more efficiently 
than had the CPSC undertaken the work. 512 
But the offeror process also had numerous detrimental implications, 
such as excessive complexity and high cost,513 and the device did not function 
very well as a mechanism for making decisions or resolving disputes. Indeed, 
there is widespread agreement among individuals and entities familiar with 
the offeror process that it generally was ineffective. This view is reinforced 
partly by the fact that no mandatory requirements resulted from half of 
the standard development proceedings and the compulsory controls devel-
oped in the remaining initiatives were somehow undone as well as by the 
ultimate demise of the procedure itself. There are numerous reasons why 
the process failed to work well, for which all involved with the mechanism 
bear some responsibility. 
Congress created a new agency and assigned it many tasks, one of 
which was to promulgate consumer product safety standards that had been 
drafted in proposed form pursuant to an unprecedented administrative 
procedure. 514 The legislative branch afforded the CPSC little guidance on 
509. For instance, decisionmaker need and participant capability can be better matched. 
See Tobias, supra note 3, at § IV.C. (listing other examples). 
510. See id. at 951 (it is very difficult to prescribe and apply eligibility criteria for selecting 
funding applicants); id. at 950-52 (listing other problems associated with compensation); Tobias, 
supra note 2, at § III.A.2.-3. (discussion of funded participation's "relative and comparative 
value" and a "contextual analysis of efficacy," both of which essentially are applicable to the 
offeror proceedings). 
511. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 95 (CPSC completion of lawn mower standard in 
less than five years reasonable in comparisoµ to time required by private standards-writing 
entities). 
512. See id. at 66-68. 
513. See id. at 62-68, 75, 94-95. 
514. See Scalia & Goodman, supra note 3 (comprehensive treatment of other tasks assigned 
CPSC); Schwartz, supra note 3 (same). 
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how the .novel mechanism might be implemented. But Congress imposed a 
number of onerous requirements upon Commission use of the offeror 
process as well as time frames for satisfaction of those requirements which 
were woefully unrealistic in light of prior experience with standard devel-
opment. m In fact, the process prescribed by statute may have been ill-
conceived, particularly insofar as it contemplated that an extra-agency entity 
could write promptly mandatory consumer product safety standards that 
would educate, would be reviewed expeditiously by, and would be acceptable 
to, CPSC staff; would satisfy the legislative commands; and would accom-
modate the political and policy preferences of the Commissioners.516 
The young agency, hampered by all of the difficulties that invariably 
accompany the creation and nascent operation of a new governmental unit-
such as implementing its organic statute517-admirably attempted to institute 
the offeror scheme but understandably proceeded by trial and error and 
made numerous initial mistakes. The CPSC decided to develop mandatory 
consumer product safety standards for several products as to which com-
pulsory requirements were marginally necessary because the products posed 
insignificant risk, were amenable to treatment through voluntary controls, 
or were not within Commission jurisdiction. Correspondingly, the CPSC 
chose to develop mandatory standards for other products that were com-
plicated or presented hazards which were difficult to remedy with compul-
sory requirements. 
The agency also instituted ineffective procedures for selecting offerors 
and chose entities that lacked adequate resources, expertise or detachment, 
especially from regulated interests. Moreover, the CPSC paid only out-of-
pocket expenses to individual members of the public and rarely supplied 
them with independent technical assistance. Furthermore, the agency af-
forded deficient guidance throughout standard development processes. 
At the outset, for example, the Commission failed to circumscribe 
standard development by limiting the number of hazards to be addressed 
or by setting priorities among them and required offerors to treat risks that 
were unsolvable or as to which there was little documentable evidence of 
injury.518 After work commenced, for instance, agency staff were not 
involved actively and even had adversary relationships with offerors; refused 
to provide necessary data in the possession of the CPSC or to secure such 
information from industry; and failed to answer questions or to facilitate 
communications with the Commissioners respecting their expectations. 
515. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 64, 95 (relating to time frames). Typical onerous 
requirements were that standards be performance-oriented "whenever feasible" and be sup-
ported by substantial evidence and that opportunities be provided for extensive extra-Com-
mission involvement. 
516. See infra note 523 and accompanying text. 
517. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 76 ("A new agency like the CPSC has to establish 
itself, set its priorities, test its statute, and experiment with its enforcement tools"). 
518. CPSC also failed to assess the risks to be treated, promising solutions to the risks 
or the potential for voluntary compliance. 
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Many of these problems subsequently plagued the CPSC, which con-
sumed twice as much time reviewing and revising offeror submissions as 
had been required to prepare them and sev~rely criticized the materials 
tendered. The CPSC as well felt compelled to contract for expensive new 
studies and testing, to substitute Commission judgment for the offeror on 
appropriate levels of safety, essentially to replicate the proposed standard 
development process, and to revise significantly the proposed recommen-
dations of offerors. In fairness, a substantial number of the offeror pro-
ceedings commenced within the same five-month period, so that the CPSC 
"did not learn of its mistakes in one project in time to avoid them in 
another. " 519 
Additional individuals and entities involved in the offeror process also 
were responsible for the way in which it functioned. Manufacturing repre-
sentatives initiated some proceedings principally for reasons of commercial 
advantage and then pursued those economic interests throughout the stand-
ard development processes. In other offeror initiatives, representatives of 
producers could have influenced unduly certain offerors; did oppose vig-
orously the imposition of requirements; dominated the proposed standard 
development effort; and fought among themselves, and with all the other 
participants, especially over the competitive implications of particular so-
lutions. Offerors may have lacked the requisite resources or expertise to 
accomplish their difficult missions; might have managed improperly standard 
development; and could have selected incorrectly, and supported inade-
quately, citizen participants. Moreover, offerors may have been unable to 
generate original, or other important, data or to secure much information 
from industry or the agency; did disregard CPSC instructions; tendered 
packages which were unresponsive, incomplete, or disorganized; or proposed 
controls that were deficient in several ways. 520 A number of these difficulties 
delayed offeror drafting of proposed standards and agency promulgation 
of regulations, necessitating much additional CPSC work, substantial revi-
sion of offeror submissions and even replication of proposed standard 
development. Individual citizens exhibited certain inadequacies of offerors 
and some weaknesses of their own but were most deficient in technical 
areas.521 
Thus, the Commission's experience with the offeror process is replete 
with contradictions. The offeror procedure was ineffective in part because 
it failed to satisfy a number of the same conditions that underlie the 
successful application of newer decisional processes.522 Moreover, the defects 
519. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 94. 
520. The proposals submitted resembled voluntary controls already rejected, were unfin-
ished, were inadequately supported or were too general, ambitious or design-oriented, or would 
have favored specific commercial concerns or provided insufficient injury protection. 
521. Some Jacked negotiating skills and a few even were recalcitrant. 
522. CPSC often did precisely the opposite of what the conditions indicated, but occa-
sionally was simply "off." See infra notes 538-41 and accompanying text (listing numerous 
conditions). 
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of the offerer mechanism appeared so intrinsic and so intractable-while 
entities responsible for the procedure apparently did so little to remedy, and 
even exacerbated, those inherent problems as well as created so many 
additional difficulties-that the process could not be made to work well. 
b. Implications of the Offerer Process for Government Sponsored Public 
Participation 
The considerations in the sentence immediately above illustrate that the 
offerer process itself may have had important deleterious ramifications for 
the perceived efficacy and quality of compensated citizen involvement in it, 
consequences which funded individuals and entities effectively were powerless 
to control. Indeed, such public participation may have been compromised or 
even overshadowed. For instance, Congress characterized the CPSA's imposi-
tion on the agency of "conflicting responsibilities"-first, to weigh heavily 
the offerer judgments reflected in proposals submitted, and second, to insure 
the adequacy of standards promulgated-as a "serious flaw" and "one of 
the principal impediments to the Commission's standard setting efforts."s23 
Those statutory mandates significantly undermined any potential impact that 
citizen input might have had because the CPSC discharged the second obliga-
tion by substantially modifying offerer recommendations, substituting agency 
judgment and disregarding nonindustry contributions. Accordingly, reimbursed 
public involvement appeared less efficacious than it actually could have been 
for reasons beyond the control of those compensated. s24 
In short, there are numerous explanations why the offerer process worked 
badly, for which all involved with the procedure have certain responsibilities. 
Moreover, that process had important detrimental implications for funded 
participation's perceived effectiveness and quality which reimbursed parties 
essentially had little power to affect. Most importantly, however, experience 
with the offerer procedure and compensated involvement in the offerer pro-
ceedings provides valuable perspectives on future experimentation. 
3. Lessons 
CPSC's experience with the offerer process, therefore, yields a number 
of instructive and unanticipated insights. Most significantly, experimentation 
at the Commission illustrates that nonregulated individuals and entities can 
have salutary effects on decisionmaking and that consensual decisional 
processes have considerable promise as applied in the administrative agency 
context. The experiment also offers helpful suggestions about situations in 
which it is most likely that nonindustry interests will enhance decisional 
523. See House Offeror Report, supra note 33, at 7-8. 
524, See id. at 6-88. Of course, the activity could have appeared less efficacious for other 
reasons attributable to the offeror process or to exogenous factors, like pressure from Congress. 
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processes and that deployment of consensual mechanisms will be successful. 
Decisional processes most probably will be improved when those responsible 
for decisions are very receptive to, and have considerable need for, non-
commercial input and the individuals and entities contributing that input 
have substantial ability to fulfill such decisionmaker need. However, com-
pensation adequate to allow meaningful public participation must be sup-
plied, while decisionmaking may be influenced by factors extrinsic to the 
citizen involvement funded, such as Congressional intervention, or even by 
the decisional technique itself. Correspondingly, consensual decisional proc-
esses are most likely to function effectively when certain conditions are 
satisfied, as examined below. 525 
Implementation of the offeror procedure principally by the Commission 
and secondarily by . offerors confirms most of these propositions. With 
respect to reimbursed non-regulated participation, the CPSC and offerors 
failed to tailor the needs of decisionmakers to the abilities of those reim-
bursed. When technical skill was required, offerors which lacked the requisite 
expertise or user consumers were chosen, and when conciliators were indi-
cated, recalci.trant individuals were chosen. When the needs of decision-
makers were matched more precisely with the capabilities of those involved 
in the offeror proceedings, funding sufficient to permit effective participa-
tion was not always provided. Compensation also was paid in circumstances 
in which public input was not needed or was unlikely to be considered or 
there was little prospect of affecting decisional processes.526 Accordingly, 
Commission experimentation teaches that program administration is impor-
tant to the success of reimbursed citizen involvement. 
Concomitantly, the experience at the CPSC testifies to the essential 
workability of consensual decisional processes when applied in the admin-
istrative sphere while affordmg instructive insights, albeit by negative im-
plication, on suitable conditions for the employment of consensual 
mechanisms. The Commission used the offeror procedure in a: number of 
contexts when its application was inadvisable or perhaps unwarranted. For 
example, the agency employed the offeror process when no regulation, much 
less mandatory control, was necessary or could be imposed feasibly or 
invoked the of feror proc~dure when petitioned to do so by certain segments 
of a particular. industry that desired regulation for reasons of competitive 
advantage, not safety. Even in circumstances which appeared more condu-
cive to the application of consensual deciSional processes, however, the 
offer9r procedure was structured less carefully than it might have been. For 
instance, the number of participants was too lilrge to permit meaningful 
525. See infra notes 538-41 and accompanying text. 
526. See supra text accompanying note 523 (identifying "fundamental flaw"). The "fun-
damental flaw" Congress identified meant that there was little prospect of affecting CPSC 
decisionmaking. Deficiencies in CPSC administration of funding in the offeror process were 
quite similar to those evidenced in experimentation with funding outside the offeror process. 
See Tobias, supra note 2, at § III.A.4. 
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exchange or the Commission refused to provide guidance when the need 
for it was imperative. Thus, CPSC experimentation illustrates that consen-
sual decisional processes should be employed selectively and once chosen, 
structured with careful attention to certain details if consensual techniques 
are to be applied successfully.527 The offeror procedure also was costly, 
even though subsequent experimentation with its successors seems inexpen-
sive, especially in contrast to other mechanisms for developing standards, 
for acquiring decisionmaking input, and for resolving disputes.528 
The Commission's experience instructs as well that a newly-created unit 
of government, plagued by all of the complications inherent in becoming 
established, is not the best governmental entity to experiment with a unique 
procedure for developing standards or with a nascent technique for pro-
moting public involvement in that process like participant compensation. 
Therefore, the CPSC probably was an inauspicious choice both for testing 
the offeror mechanism and the reimbursement concept. However, if another 
substantial participant funding effort-that conducted by the Federal Trade 
Commission-could be described similarly,529 while the offeror process could 
be made to work only in a small number of situations and even then at 
considerable cost, perhaps both participant reimbursement and the off eror 
procedure were deficient in certain respects. These considerations and nu-
merous factors examined already suggest that Congressional abolition of 
the offeror mechanism may have been indicated. Thus, in light of the 
problems encountered in making the process function effectively, the expense 
incident to doing so, and determinations respecting allocation of limited 
resources, the legislative action appears reasonable.530 
B. General Conclusions 
Compensated noncommercial involvement in Commission off eror initi-
atives was valuable enough to justify revitalization of the reimbursement 
527. See infra notes 538-41 and accompanying text (number of conditions that may be 
important to success). 
528. See supra note 513 (relating to the offeror mechanism); ACUS Recommendation 86-
3, 51 Fed. Reg.- 25,641, 25,643 (1986) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1987)) (preamble). 
Harter, supra note 176, at 56 (relating to the apparently inexpensive nature of its successors); 
cf. ACUS Recommendation 85-5, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,893, 52,895 (1985) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 
305.85-5 (1987)) (preamble) (ACUS belief that, although aspects of negotiated rulemakings 
may entail some short-term additional costs, those costs are more than offset by potential 
long-range savings); Susskind & McMahon, supra note 1, at 152, 163 (EPA "negotiated 
rulemaking appeared to produce more legitimate outcomes at a lower cost than usual" but 
"too few data available to calculate formally the cost-effectiveness of negotiated rulemaking"). 
529. Boyer, Funding Public Participation in Agency Proceedings: The Federal Trade 
Commission Experience, 10 GEo. L. J. 51, 140 (1981) {"The FTC of the 1970's, in many 
respects, was a particularly unfortunate time and place to experiment with direct funding for 
public participation"). 
530. Much that offeror experimentation teaches is not novel- or unanticipated but even 
this is valuable insofar as it reaffirms what had been reported before. See infra note 540 and 
accompanying text (relating to the offeror process, for example, agency involvement must be 
planned carefully); Tobias, supra note 2, at note 368 (relating to participant funding). 
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concept and ongoing work in appropriate circumstances at the CPSC and 
at additional units of government. Funded participation actually was quite 
beneficial, considering all of the limitations imposed, particularly by the 
offeror process. Similarly, that novel procedure operated rather respectably, 
in light of the formidable obstacles to success, thereby testifying to the 
inherent workability and considerable promise of consensual decisional 
processes, even in their earliest, least refined conceptualizations. Therefore, 
it is unnecessary to ascertain whether the offeror process should be reinsti-
tuted because continuing experimentation with successors such as regulatory 
negotiation ought to suffice. 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE EXPERIMENTATION 
Participant reimbursement is one condition that will be important to 
the successful application of consensual decisional processes in certain 
contexts.531 I have offered already numerous prescriptions for experimen-
tation with compensation.532 Accordingly, the recommendation summarizing 
the suggestions made only needs to be stated here: "Participant funding 
should be revived and rigorously evaluated, other mechanisms for rectifying 
the imbalance in input and improving decisionmaking should be explored 
and analyzed, and the cost and efficacy of these alternatives should be 
compared. " 533 
Vigorous experimentation with successors of the offeror process should 
continue and ought to be assessed closely, alternative techniques for en-
hancing decisionmaking and for resolving disputes should be explored and 
evaluated, and the expense and effectiveness of the mechanism ought to be 
contrasted. Experimentation, which emphasizes diversity and flexibility, 
should proceed selectively at the Commission and at additional governmental 
entities in circumstances in which consensual procedures have functioned 
well, appeared to have potential or have not been tried. 534 
531. For example, in regulatory negotiations, individual citizens or "public interest group" 
representatives that participate probably will require resource support so that they can be 
effective. See Harter, supra note 176, at 55-57; Susskind & McMahon, supra note l, at 160-
61. Indeed, ACUS twice has recognized the need for such support and recommended that 
provision be made for it. See ACUS Recommendation 85-5, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,893, 52,896 
(1985) (codified at l C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1987)) (paragraph 9); ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 
47 Fed. Reg. 30,708, 30,710 (1982) (codified at l C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1987)) (paragraph 9). 
532. See Tobias, supra note 2, at § IV.; cf. Tobias, supra note 3, at § IV. (earlier 
prescriptions). 
533. Tobias, supra note 2, at text accompanying note 380. See supra note 531 (ACUS 
twice recognized need for resource support for public participation in negotiated rulemakings 
and recommended that provisions be made for such support). 
534. For instance, work with regulatory negotiation should continue at the Environmental 
Protection Agency, because the agency has experimented successfully with the mechanism and 
its experience can save expense, such as start-up costs. See Perritt, supra note l, at 1674-82; 
Susskind & McMahon, supra note l; see also supra note l (compilations of agencies that have 
negotiated rulemakings completed, ongoing or contemplated and of mechanisms available in 
federal administrative agency context). 
1987] INSTRUCTIVE PRECURSOR 473 
The experimentation ought to be planned carefully. Agencies should 
study consensual mechanisms and attempt to designate situations in which 
their use would be most effective, although this exercise necessarily will 
require case-by-case consideration of the constellation of variables present 
in specific instances.535 Many units of government currently possess sufficient 
authority and have adequate resources to initiate most types of experimen-
tation.536 Nevertheless, agencies contemplating application of consesual de-
cisional techniques may want to assess their circumstances and if deficiencies 
are discovered the governmental entities should request the necessary au-
thorization and appropriations from Congress.537 Agencies should implement 
efforts that maximize the potential for flexible experimentation, are admin-
istered carefully and capitalize on experience at the Commission with the 
off eror process, albeit by negative inference, or at other agencies with 
similar devices. 
Previous experience with consensual decisional processes, especially reg-
ulatory negotiation, indicates that their employment is more likely to be 
successful when certain conditions are satisfied although situation-specific 
analysis will be necessary. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify many 
conditions that will apply in most instances. The number of affected interests 
participating ought to be circumscribed, none should possess so much power 
that it can control the outcome, and all interests should be committed to 
the process, believing that they stand to benefit.538 The issues in dispute 
535. Of course, this complicates planning. See infra notes 538-41 and accompanying text 
(numerous relevant variables); see also ACUS Recommendation 86-3, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,641, 
25,643 (1986) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1987)) (preamble); ACUS Recommendation 
85-5, SO Fed. Reg. 52,893, 52,895 (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1987) (preamble) (discussions 
of need for, and difficulties entailed in, case-by-case consideration). 
536. See Harter, supra note 176, at 12, 22, 107-09, 112-13 (helpful background discussion 
of agency power to conduct negotiated rulemakings); Susskind & McMahon, supra note 1, at 
157-59 (same); cf. Perritt, supra note 1, at 1629 (finding extant agency authority sufficient to 
conduct negotiated rulemakings); ACUS Recommendation 86-3, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,641, 25,643-
45 (1986) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1987) (recognizing extant agency authority sufficient 
to initiate experimentation with certain other types of ADR); Tobias, supra note 3, at § III.A. 
(sufficient implied agency authority to fund public participants). 
537. Congress should be receptive to such requests given the successful, cost effective 
nature of experimentation to date. Comprehensive legislation has not been enacted, although 
ACUS has recommended that Congress "facilitate the regulatory negotiation process by passing 
legislation." ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,708, 30,709 (1982) (codified at 1 
C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1987)) (paragraph 2). See Perritt, supra note 1, at 1629 (cautioning against 
Congressional amendment of the Administrative Procedure Act because of potential flexibility 
loss and of Federal Advisory Committee Act because unnecessary although recommending that 
General Services Administration amend regulations to clarify uncertainty regarding advisory 
committees and ADR); see also ACUS Recommendation 86-3, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,641, 25,643-45 
(1986) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1987)) (recognizing necessity for Congress to authorize 
experimentation with certain types of ADR and so recommending). 
538. See ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,708, 30,709 (1982) (codified at 1 
C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1987)) (paragraphs 4(c), (e) and (f)); Harter, supra note 176, at 45-49, 51-
52; Perritt, supra note 1, at 1643-44. Susskind and McMahon agree with the last proposition 
in the text. See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 1, at 157. But they disagree with the first 
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ought to be "ripe for decision" and should be sufficiently numerous and 
different to allow trading, while disposition, of the questions should not be 
governed by basic research and resolution of the issues cannot demand 
compromise by participants on core principles.539 Those involved should 
anticipate that a decision will be imposed externally, if they do not agree, 
and participants ought to have a "reasonable expectation'' that the agency 
will be involved and receptive to the accommodation reached.540 These 
conditions also may have important components, such as provision of 
funding for nonregulated interests that participate. Finally, it is important 
to recognize that the requirements enumerated may vary, and that other 
conditions may apply, in any given context.541 
two propositions. See id. at 1S3-56. I rely most substantially here and in the remainder of this 
paragraph on Harter and Perritt, supra and on ACUS Recommendations 82-4 and 8S-S 
premised respectively on Harter and Perritt, but Susskind and McMahon are very helpful. Of 
course, much said about the offerer process in this article also applies. For example, the 
infighting among manufacturers in an industry observed in several offerer proceedings prefi-
'gures Professor Perritt's statement that the "most difficult challenge to a negotiated agreement 
involves not the process at the negotiating table but the process of resolving intraconstituency 
disagreements away from the table." Perritt, supra at 171S; cf. ACUS Recommendation 8S-
S, SO Fed. Reg. 52,893, S2,89S (1986) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 30S.8S-5 (1987)) (paragraph 7) 
(recognizing need to "address internal disagreements within a particular constituency"). 
539. See ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,708, 30,709 (1982) (codified at 1 
C.F.R. § 30S.82-4 (1987)) (paragraphs 4(a), (b) and (d)); Harter, supra note 176, at 47-S2, 
Perritt, supra note 1, at 1643-44. Susskind & McMahon essentially agree with the last three 
propositions. See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 1, at 1S2, 160-61. But they disagree with 
the first proposition. See id. at 1S6-S7. 
S40. See ACUS Recommendation 8S-S, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,893, S2,89S (198S) (codified at 1 
C.F.R. § 305.8S-5 (1987)) (paragraphs 1 and 2); ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 47 Fed. Reg. 
30,708, 30,709-10 (1982) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 30S.82-4 (1987)) (paragraphs 4(a), 4(g) and 
8); Harter, supra note 176, at 47-48, 51-S2, S7-67; Perritt, supra note 1, at 1711-13. Susskind 
& McMahon agree with the second proposition. See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 1, at 
1S7-63. But they found participant willingness to negotiate energetically and in good faith as 
significant as deadlines. See id. at 157. See also Perritt, supra at 1629 ("most important 
insight" gleaned from analyzing completed negotiated rulemakings was that agency sponsoring 
negotiations should participate). 
541. The conditions enumerated in the paragraph in the text are drawn principally from 
experience with negotiated rulemakings. The evaluator of four completed negotiated rulemak-
ings has offered the following cogent admonitions: 
It is important to view both the 1982 and the 198S [negotiated rulemaking) 
recommendations of the ACUS as a guide to issues to be considered rather than a 
formula to be followed. Negotiation is intrinsically a process that cannot be specified 
entirely in advance. Accordingly, what will 'work' in a particular case depends on 
the number of factors: substantive issues, perception of the agency's position by 
affected parties, relationships among the parties, authority of party representatives 
in the negotiations, negotiating style of the representatives, divergence of views within 
each constituency represented, and skill of agency personnel and mediators. Some 
of these variables almost certainly will change several times during the negotiations. 
An agency cannot expect that the pattern followed successfully by another agency, 
or even by itself on another issue, can be transplanted without modification to 
another negotiation. 
Perritt, supra note 1, at 1629 (citation omitted); accord, ACUS Recommendation 8S-S, SO 
1987] INSTRUCTIVE PRECURSOR 475 
Congress could institute the recommendations above. It can analyze 
prior experimentation with consensual techniques, delineate appropriate 
circumstances for future work in substantive statutes and make available 
sufficient money for experimentation through appropriations measures. 
Should Congress decide not to enact authorizing legislation, agencies cur-
rently possess the requisite power to continue experimenting selectively with 
consensual decisional procedures.542 
The experimentation that is conducted ought to be assessed "rigorously" 
by an expert evaluator who is not affiliated with the agency. 543 An attempt 
then should be undertaken to reach more definitive judgments than before 
regarding the effectiveness of consensual decisional processes and the optimal 
conditions for their application. Finally, the efficacy and cost of these 
mechanisms should be contrasted with other measures employed to improve 
decisionmaking and resolve disputes. 
CONCLUSION 
Consumer Product Safety Commission experimentation with the off eror 
process and with funded nonindustry participation in that procedure is very 
informative. Compensated citizen involvement was sufficiently worthwhile 
to support additional experimentation in appropriately tailored contexts. 
The offeror process did not work particularly well. The experience of the 
CPSC, however, does afford numerous valuable insights for successful, 
future experimentation with the successors of the off eror procedure which 
appears to be promising mechanisms for enhancing decisional processes and 
for facilitating dispute resolution in the modem administrative state. 
Fed. Reg. 52,893, 52,895 (1985) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1987)) (preamble). Of course, 
these admonitions apply equally to experimentation with other consensual decisional processes 
as well as to decisions to employ particular procedures in specific contexts. See ACUS 
Recommendation 86-3, 51 fed. Reg. 25,641, 25,643 (1986) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 
(1987)) (preamble). For comprehensive catalogs of conditions and their components as well as 
helpful guidance for agency implementation of consensual processes, see ACUS Recommen-
dation 86-3, supra, at 25,643-45; ACUS Recommendation 85-5, supra, at 52,895-96; ACUS 
Recommendation 82-4, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,708, 30,708-10 (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1987)); 
Perritt, supra, at 1708-17; Harter, supra note 176. 
542. See supra notes 536-537 (discussions of agency power and advisability of Congres-
sional implementation). Courts should not invalidate such exercise of authority unless it clearly 
is in excess of agency statutory power. See also ACUS Recommendation 86-3, 51 Fed. Reg. 
25,641, 25,643 (1986) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1987)) (Congress and courts should 
not inhibit agency uses of ADR by requiring formality where inappropriate). 
543. See. Susskind & McMahon, supra note 1, at 140-42 (helpful discussion of evaluation); 
Harter & Eads, Policy Instruments, Institutions and Objectives: An Analytical Framework for 
Assessing "Alternatives" to Regulation, 37 ADMIN. L. REv. 221 (1985) (broader, theoretical 
discussion of techniques); see also ACUS Recommendation 86-3, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,641, 25,643 
(1986) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1987)) (preamble) (recognizing increasing use of ADR 
and recommending supplementation with further empirical research). 
